The Limits of Diplomacy: Missile Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Defense
Kenneth G. Weiss
In the U.S. government, there is a tendency to distinguish between national security and nonproliferation issues. National security issues raise a threat to the United States, while nonproliferation issues involve the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related missile delivery systems, which may raise regional stability concerns but not necessarily national security ones. Because the United States accepted Russia and China as nuclear and ballistic missile powers, their missile capabilities raised concerns about national security but not nonproliferation–unless Moscow or Beijing exported missiles or related technology. When the North Koreans tested a Taepo Dong I as a three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV) in 1998, however, national security and missile nonproliferation issues began to merge, and that event may have effects as far reaching, possibly, as the Soviet launch of Sputnik in the 1950s.(1) The Taepo Dong I test seemed to confirm the Rumsfeld Report mandated by Congress, which disagreed with a controversial 1995 National Intelligence Estimate that claimed that in the next fifteen years there would be no ballistic missile threat to the continental United States from countries other than the traditional missile powers.(2)
In this article I will examine the growing regional and global missile threat from the Third World, including missile programs and efforts to acquire foreign assistance from countries such as Russia, China, or North Korea, and to obtain technology on the gray market. I will also address the growing interest in the Third World and elsewhere in developing space launch vehicle programs and the problems that the development of commercial space poses for the spread of missile capabilities. These developments in missile threat will be contrasted against U.S. political-military policies for dealing with missile proliferation, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), missile sanction policies, and regional policies to roll back missile programs of concern and to cut off foreign assistance from other countries, especially Russia, China, and North Korea. I will also discuss other possible tools, such as regional arms control forums, threats, and use of force. Finally, I will examine the limits of diplomacy in dealing with missile proliferation and the need for a technological approach, specifically antimissile systems, to complement diplomacy and provide for defense against attack on the United States and its allies.
THE MISSILE PROLIFERATION THREAT
In the 1980s, the United States recognized the growing threat of missile proliferation, particularly through the spread of space launch vehicle programs.(3) The use of ballistic missiles by both sides during the Iran-Iraq War, as well as the use of SCUDs in the Afghani and the later Yemeni civil wars, underscored the dangers of missile proliferation.(4) In 1987, the United States joined with its G-7 partners–the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the then Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan–to form the Missile Technology Control Regime.(5) Since 1987, the MTCR has expanded to include thirty-two countries considered important for controlling missile technology, most recently Ukraine, Poland, and the Czech Republic.(6)
The Missile Technology Control Regime tries to prevent the spread of missiles, including ballistic, cruise, space launch vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and remotely piloted vehicles, that can carry a payload of 500 kilograms to a distance of 300 kilometers, or any system that is intended to carry weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.(7) Although SCUD missiles are of MTCR concern, the MTCR does not focus on many of the countries that still have SCUDs, which the Soviets exported widely; these are generally former members of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, like Bulgaria and Slovakia; Soviet successor states, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan; and remnants of Soviet inroads in the Third World, including Afghanistan, Yemen, and Vietnam. (Their systems are aging, and most of those countries have fewer than fifty launchers.)(8) Although the United States would certainly like to see these countries give up their missiles of proliferation concern and join the MTCR, members of the MTCR are generally concerned about the countries in the missile arc of crisis: the Korean peninsula, South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.
In those regions, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, and to a certain extent Israel have the most advanced programs and pose the greatest threat to regional and global stability. Iraq’s program was curtailed by defeat in the Gulf War, after which the UN allowed Baghdad only missiles with a capability of 150 kilometers. However, even while Iraq was ostensibly in compliance with UN resolutions, it apparently sought technology such as guidance systems from Russia to reconstitute its longer-range missile systems. Now that the UN inspectors have left Iraq, Baghdad will probably revive its missile programs. The projects of concern in Egypt, Syria, and Libya have been dormant or advancing slowly, but may pick up speed with possible help from outside suppliers developing in the Third World.
Over the last few years, missile tensions seemed to escalate particularly in South Asia. In 1997, India was increasingly concerned about reports that China had provided Pakistan with M-11 missiles and related production capabilities, that Pakistan’s M-11 missiles were operational, and that Pakistan had tested them.(9) Pakistan, in turn, was disturbed by reports that India had deployed the Prithvi-1 near the border and continued to test the longer range Prithvi-2.(10) Both countries hurled charges and vowed to match the other’s actions. After the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party was elected in India in 1998, Islamabad tested the Ghauri missile, which is apparently a No Dong missile from North Korea. That test probably removed any lingering doubts in the Indian government about the wisdom of testing nuclear devices(11) and helped spur the development of the Agni missile program, which had been suspended after three tests.(12) The recent test of the Agni II medium-range ballistic missile, in turn, provoked the Pakistanis to test the Shaheen I short-range ballistic missile, complicating efforts to defuse tensions in South Asia in the wake of the nuclear tests in May 1998.(13) The Pakistanis are also concerned about India’s development of a nuclear-powered submarine, for which the Sagarika sea-launched ballistic missile is apparently being developed, as well as India’s possible plans for basing short-range ballistic missiles on surface ships.(14)
In the Mideast, Iran apparently acquired SS-4 technology from Russia for its Shahab 4 missile; the Israelis claimed Teheran could target Israel in 1999 when it was fully developed.(15) Moreover, Iran was developing other longer-range missiles based on North Korea’s No Dong missile, and it obtained missile-related technology, such as guidance components, from China.(16) In July 1998, the Iranians tested the Shahab-3 (No Dong).(17) Although the test may have failed, it served notice that Iran’s program continued to advance. Indeed, there are reports that Iran has tested a ballistic missile aboard a cargo ship.(18) Under pressure from Israel and the U.S. Congress, Washington invoked sanctions against various Russian entities for transferring missile technology to Iran.(19) Russia’s contract to sell a S-300 SAM missile to Cyprus also precipitated a crisis with Turkey.(20) Turkey, a member of the MTCR, feared that the sale would undermine its air superiority over Cyprus, inter alia, and may have become interested in developing or acquiring a surface-to-surface missile or perhaps obtaining the Arrow antimissile system from Israel.(21)
Although the MTCR has had significant successes to its credit, the most difficult missile development programs remain, particularly those in India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. There has been concern about a possible long-range cruise missile development program in South Korea, although Seoul has denied it.(22) Additionally, there could be renewed interest by Taiwan in such a program as a result of Chinese missile flexing in the Straits in 1995 and 1996.(23)
Although the Condor missile program, which involved Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq in joint development, has been terminated, there remains a tendency by missile-developing countries to cooperate with one another.(24) (Indeed, the Egyptians are apparently continuing to develop the Vector missile, an offshoot of the Condor program.(25)) Although the Israelis were deeply concerned about Argentina’s cooperation with Egypt and Iraq in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Israel itself may have assisted South Africa with its now terminated program(26) and China with the guidance system for the CSS-2.(27) There are also reports that Tel Aviv may help India with antimissile system development directly or through Russia, despite concerns about Russian missile aid to Iran.(28) Moreover, North Korea has been involved in joint development programs with Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan and has exported SCUDs to Syria(29) (see table 1).
TABLE 1 The Missile Capabilities of Proliferant Countries
Country Missile Producer Kilometers
Egypt SCUD B Russia 308
Vector Egypt 708+
India Prithvi I India 155
Prithvi II India 250
Naval Prithvi India 250
Agni India 2083
Agni II India 2083+
ballistic missile India 3330+
Sagarika India 250
Space launch vehicles: SLV, ASLV, PSLV,
GSLV under development.
Iran SCUD B North Korea 308
SCUD C North Korea 517
Shahab 3 North Korea 1167
Shahab 4 Iran 1167+
Shahab 5 Iran ?
Iraq SCUD B North Korea 308
Al Hussein Iraq 583+
Badr 2000 Iraq 900
Space launch vehicle program now suspended.
Israel Jericho 1 Israel 500
Jericho 2 Israel 1500
Jericho 3? Israel 1300
Space launch program: Shavit SLV, Shavit
Libya SCUD B Russia 308
Al Fatah Libya 950
North Korea SCUD B North Korea 308
SCUD C North Korea 517
No Dong North Korea 1300
Taepo Dong 1 North Korea 2000
Taepo Dong 2 North Korea 4000
Pakistan HATF2 Pakistan 300
Shaheen ? Pakistan 600
M-11 China 300
Ghauri North Korea 1167
Ghauri II (?) ? 2500
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 China 2917
Syria SCUD B Russia 308
SCUD C North Korea 500
Country Missile in Kilograms
Egypt SCUD B 985
India Prithvi I 1000
Prithvi II 500
Naval Prithvi 500
Agni II ?
ballistic missile ?
Space launch vehicles: SLV, ASLV, PSLV,
GSLV under development.
Iran SCUD B 985
SCUD C 700
Shahab 3 700
Shahab 4 1000
Shahab 5 ?
Iraq SCUD B 985
Al Hussein 500
Badr 2000 450
Space launch vehicle program now suspended.
Israel Jericho 1 750
Jericho 2 1000
Jericho 3? 5000-7000
Space launch program: Shavit SLV, Shavit
Libya SCUD B 985
Al Fatah 500
North Korea SCUD B 985
SCUD C 700
No Dong 1000
Taepo Dong 1 1000
Taepo Dong 2 1000
Pakistan HATF2 500
Shaheen ? 500
Ghauri II (?) 1000
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 2200
Syria SCUD B 985
SCUD C 500
Country Missile Status
Egypt SCUD B In service
India Prithvi I In service
Prithvi II Testing
Naval Prithvi Development
Agni II Testing
ballistic missile Development
Space launch vehicles: SLV, ASLV, PSLV,
GSLV under development.
Iran SCUD B In service
SCUD C In service
Shahab 3 Tested
Shahab 4 Development
Shahab 5 Development
Iraq SCUD B Not in service
Al Hussein Not in service
Badr 2000 Not in service
Space launch vehicle program now suspended.
Israel Jericho 1 In service
Jericho 2 In service
Jericho 3? Unknown
Space launch program: Shavit SLV, Shavit
Libya SCUD B In service
Al Fatah Development
North Korea SCUD B In service
SCUD C In service
No Dong In service
Taepo Dong 1 Tested as three-stage SLV
Taepo Dong 2 Development
Pakistan HATF2 In service
Shaheen ? Tested
M-11 Not in service
Ghauri II (?) Development
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 In service
Syria SCUD B In service
SCUD C In service
Source: Range/payload figures and other details for the missile capabilities of proliferant states often differ in unclassified sources or are not listed. For example, the National Air Intelligence Center lists only maximum ranges and not payloads, since the range of a missile depends on the weight of the payload. At best, the figures in the table provide an impression of range/payload and other details of proliferant missile capabilities. As the whole point of the Rumsfeld Commission report is that we do not know enough about those countries’ capabilities, one could hardly expect definitive figures on their programs. See the National Air Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NAIC-1031-0985-98 and NAIC-1031-0985-99; Dov S. Zakheim, “Old Rivalries, New Arsenals: Should the United States Worry?” IEEE Spectrum (March 1999): 30-31; and the Rumsfeld Report.
With the possible exception of Germany’s program during World War II, no missile program is entirely indigenous. Although the missile technology of MTCR concern first proliferated with the Soviet export of SCUDs, the United States and other Western countries exported missile-related systems and technology before the creation of the regime.(30) Western countries assisted India’s space launch vehicle program in its early stages, and that provided the basis for its missile program. Indeed, India’s missile program traces its origins to the U.S.-produced Scout Sounding Rocket.(31) Western firms, especially in Europe, provided technology for Argentina’s Condor II missile program, which was based on the U.S. Pershing II.(32) Thus, missile technology comes largely from MTCR members or their adherents, with Russia and China the worst offenders. In the West, as the CIA pointed out in a brief to Congress, missile-aspirant states have sought technology illegally from Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France, especially for dual-use goods not specifically controlled by the MTCR and other multilateral export control regimes. There are also reports of leakages from the Soviet successor states,(33) and various countries have been cited as transshipment points for missile-related technology, including Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Austria, Italy, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.(34) But missile-aspirant countries find it increasingly difficult to obtain technology controlled by the MTCR in the West.(35) They largely look to Russia, China, and North Korea for help.(36)
It is useful to contrast India’s program with those of Pakistan and Iran. Although in its early stages it apparently received a boost from Western countries, particularly for its space launch vehicle project, India’s program is largely indigenous, even though New Delhi no doubt continues to seek missile-related technology on the gray market and elsewhere. Since the inception of the integrated guided missile program in 1983, only one of India’s five missiles has been in serial production–the Prithvi-1. With China’s and North Korea’s significant aid, however, Pakistan has arguably achieved parity or better with India. Alone Iran did not make much progress, but with North Korean and, more significantly, Russian technology, its program has advanced greatly. (Chinese help seems to have been more limited.) Thus, India’s largely indigenous program has developed slowly while Pakistan’s and perhaps Iran’s have been boosted by significant outside help.(37)
Fishing for widgets on the gray market does not seem as helpful, and integration of systems from multiple sources may even delay a program. According to a recent CIA report, “during the first half of 1998, Western nations were not as important sources for WMD-related goods and materials as in past years. Increasing and rigorous export controls and effective cooperation among supplier countries have led foreign WMD programs to look elsewhere for controlled dual-use goods.”(38) However, should the United States succeed in stemming the flow from Russia, China, and perhaps North Korea, other sources, both inside the MTCR and outside, may become more significant. With the development of successful missile programs, Iran, Pakistan, and other countries could become sources for missile-aspirant countries in the Third World.(39) Even so, assistance from Russia and China may still be necessary to integrate the components and technologies into an effective system.(40)
Thus, it may become even more important to control Western sources of global positioning system technology, design and technical data, and other enabling technologies such as computers.(41) The global positioning system, for example, is an enabling technology for cruise missile development that could become more widespread among proliferants in the future–particularly in view of the success of the U.S. Tomahawk long-range land attack cruise missile.(42) There are reports that North Korea, China, and India may be acquiring global positioning equipment on the commercial market to improve the accuracy of their missile systems.(43) There is also concern that long-range cruise missiles may proliferate with the possible sale of the French Apache cruise missile. Even so, if nonproliferation efforts call force missile aspirant countries to truly rely on indigenous development, their programs may be slowed markedly.
COMMERCIAL SPACE AND SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES
The spread of commercial space technology, including space launch vehicle technology, may be spinning out of control. As previously mentioned, U.S. global positioning system, international maritime satellite systems, and the Russian global navigation satellite system could be used for missile guidance.(44) (The Chinese may even be considering developing their own global positioning system and have apparently established a maritime satellite system for various coastal cities.)(45) Moreover, there is increasing availability of high-resolution satellite photographs on a commercial basis, from the United States, the French, and, more recently, the Russians, which can assist missile systems with location and targeting.(46) Indeed, one U.S. company has recently launched a satellite that will provide one-meter resolution for commercial imaging, which will allow photographs of images as small as trucks and cars. The increasing availability of satellite communications can assist with a variety of military communication requirements.(47)
The United States, Russia, France, and China have long had space launch vehicle projects based on their missile programs. However, the rising use of space for commercial purposes has increased interest in SLV programs on the part of India, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Australia, Japan, Spain, Italy, South Korea, and Taiwan. Arianespace, a French company, in the past has talked about combining efforts with other space launch programs, such as those of India, China, Brazil, and Russia, because it does not believe that the market will allow more than two or three programs to survive on a commercial basis.(48) Some believe that no commercial program is viable unless it is linked to a military program, because the development and infrastructure costs are prohibitive.
However, there is a backlog of satellites waiting to be launched, and the market for space launch could grow by 86 percent from 1998 to 2007, with some estimating that 1,697 satellites could be launched during those years. Even so, the market is dominated by Western systems, such as Delta II at thirteen launches per year, Atlas at nine, and Ariane at seventeen, with Russia’s Proton launching nine satellites and China six per year. Moreover, there are other possible Western entrants in the market, such as Boeing Delta III and Sea Launch, Kelly Eclipse, Kistler K-1, and Pioneer Pathfinder.(49) U.S. companies such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing have joined with Russia’s Proton and Ukraine’s Zenit in the launch market.(50) Hughes has even contracted for ten satellite launches on Japan’s H2A.(51)
NASA plans to develop the reusable launch vehicle and the single-stage-to-orbit concept in cooperation with industry, which could dramatically lower costs and increase U.S. competitiveness. The continued development of the Pentagon’s enhanced expendable launch vehicle program will probably subsidize the development of the Boeing Delta 4 and the Lockheed Atlas 2AR vehicles, making these companies more competitive with Arianespace, which is already losing its share of the market to International Launch Services, a joint U.S./Russian venture.(52) Even Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been developing a gas gun to study high-impact physics that can allow projectiles to achieve speeds greater than escape velocity. If developed commercially, it could be used to launch satellites into orbit, although the satellites would have to be well protected.(53) A recent string of U.S. military satellite launch failures may add to the backlog of satellites to be launched, increasing reliance on foreign launch-service providers and encouraging the development of SLV programs in other countries.
Yet even considerations of competitiveness will not necessarily deter new entrants–open or clandestine–from the market, given the national prestige associated with an SLV program. Japan has proceeded with its program even though the cost of a satellite launch on Japan’s H2 is twice the market rate. The Japanese have limited their launches to twice a year to appease the locals around Tanegashima launch site, which will make it difficult to bring down costs. As mentioned previously, Hughes has agreed to launch ten satellites on Japan’s H2A, which the Japanese developed to be more competitive internationally, although it is unclear whether Hughes will actually exercise its option if the Japanese do not bring down the launch costs. In spite of the difficulty of entry into the market and the country’s economic difficulties, South Korea spent considerable sums in 1996 to develop a commercial launch program on top of its sounding rocket program. North Korea’s apparently failed launch of a satellite aboard a Taepo Dong I has seemed to encourage Seoul to put greater emphasis on its own SLV program.(54)
Growing cooperation between countries with SLV programs may increase the difficulty of monitoring technology transfers. In addition to Arianespace’s talks with international competitors, U.S., German, and Australian corporations are forging alliances with commercial space launch companies in Russia and the Ukraine, as previously mentioned.(55) And there have been charges of missile technology leakages from U.S. corporations to China through the launch of U.S. satellites on China’s Long March, despite American safeguards.(56)
The United States has now signed commercial agreements with China, Russia, and Ukraine allowing the launch of U.S. satellites, and it no longer opposes other countries’ support for SLV programs, provided they are MTCR members. The negotiation of commercial satellite agreements has largely been driven by economic considerations, with little reference to nonproliferation concerns. However, the United States continues to dominate the commercial satellite market, which gives Washington potential leverage to extract concessions on missile proliferation issues.(57)
MISSILE PROLIFERATION AND U.S. POLICIES
Although the MTCR is a supplier regime, it is, one could argue, the centerpiece in U.S. efforts to control missile proliferation. Admission to the MTCR is by consensus, and the MTCR sometimes forms teams to prepare a country for membership or to deal with another country on some aspect of missile nonproliferation.(58) The MTCR has also sponsored seminars among nonmember countries to heighten awareness of dangers, such as being used as transshipment points for missile-related items or as locations for front companies for proliferants. For example, a shipment of ammonium perchlorate destined for Iraq was successfully intercepted in Saudi Arabia.(59)
The United States, of course, is engaged in both multilateral and bilateral efforts to prevent proliferation. For example, the efforts of Washington and other MTCR members to engage Argentina helped persuade Buenos Aires to abandon not only the Condor missile program but also its nuclear weapons program.(60) Brazil gave up its nuclear program as well as its missile program, which had not gone very far. South Africa did the same,(61) and all three countries joined the MTCR. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to eliminate their strategic missile programs, although they apparently retained some missiles of MTCR concern.(62) Ukraine made enough headway in agreeing to give up its missiles of concern to be admitted to the MTCR. Recently, there was concern that the North Koreans would test the Taepo Dong II, a longer range missile that could conceivably reach Alaska and Hawaii. But the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other countries applied considerable pressure and finally persuaded Pyongyang to abandon efforts to test this longer range missile in exchange for Washington’s easing some trade sanctions.
The MTCR divides missile technology into two groups: Category I includes whole ballistic and cruise missile systems, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as major subsystems like rocket engines and thrust vector controls; Category II controls dual-use missile technologies like rocket propellant, specially designed computers, guidance systems, ablative materials, and AC/DC converters. Applications for those items are to be carefully reviewed, especially for countries with projects of missile proliferation concern.(63) To strengthen the MTCR, the U.S. Congress included missile sanctions on third-party transfers in the National Defense Authorization Act FY 1990. The severity of the sanctions depends on whether the illicit transfer involved Category I or Category II items, and the Helms Amendment makes the sanctions particularly severe for “non-market economies,” namely, China.(64)
In effect, sanctions were a tool for dealing with potential suppliers and recipients of missile technology that were not members of the MTCR (members are exempt from U.S. sanctions). In 1988, shortly after the MTCR was formed, the Chinese transferred CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, sparking an intense U.S. diplomatic effort to limit the impact of the transfer. The Saudis were persuaded to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to demonstrate that the missiles would be limited to conventional warheads only. The Chinese pledged that they would not transfer nuclear warheads and eventually committed themselves not to transfer CSS-2s to any other country in the Mideast or elsewhere.(65) Because there were no sanctions at that time, neither China nor Saudi Arabia was sanctioned.
One could argue that sanctions have been most effective when they have interfered with the launch of U.S. satellites on Chinese and Russian rockets. After the Chinese transferred M-11 short-range ballistic missile-related technology to Pakistan, the United States imposed Category II sanctions on both Beijing and Islamabad in 1991. These sanctions cut off the transfer of U.S. satellites to China for launch on Chinese boosters, and the United States only lifted the sanctions in 1992 when the Chinese agreed to observe MTCR guidelines. Washington reimposed sanctions in 1993 after Beijing violated its pledge by transferring thirty-four M-11 missiles to Pakistan in retaliation for Washington’s sale of F-16s to Taiwan. However, the United States again lifted the sanctions in October 1994, and the Chinese, in turn, reaffirmed their commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime. They also agreed not to export any ground-to-ground missiles with 300 kilometers/500 kilograms capabilities or any with inherent capability–in other words, any missile that could be altered to exceed the 300/500 limit (e.g., Iraqi SCUDs were given a reduced payload so they could travel farther). However, the United States remained concerned about reports that the Chinese were transferring M-11 missile production capabilities to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran and elsewhere.(66)
Sanctions were also imposed on Russia for transferring cryogenic rocket engines and related technology to India’s space launch vehicle program. India intended to use the engine in its geostationary launch vehicle, which could launch heavy communications satellites to the high altitude necessary to achieve geostationary orbit–a capability only the United States, Russia, French Arianespace, China, and Japan currently possess. In return for Washington’s lifting the sanctions, which had prevented Russia’s launching of U.S. satellites on their boosters and other space-related cooperation, Moscow agreed to limit the number of engines transferred and not to provide the Indians with related technology, which was of greater concern than the engines themselves. Moscow also agreed to join the MTCR.(67) New Delhi still has not launched its first geostationary space launch vehicle, which is long overdue.
Missile proliferation sanctions have also been imposed on Israel, South Africa, and North Korea. The Israelis agreed to observe MTCR regulations, and South Africa eventually gave up its missile program of concern along with its nuclear program.(68) South Africa also joined the MTCR. Sanctions have had little effect on North Korea, which is under a virtual embargo. Moreover, it is not yet clear that recent sanctions on Russian entities for transferring missile-related technology to Iran have had much effect. These are apparently not the MTCR sanctions mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act, because the Russians are now members of the MTCR, but they are similar to the sanctions called for by chemical-biological weapons legislation. However, the recent refusal of the United States to raise the quota on launches of U.S. satellites on Russian rockets until Moscow tightens its controls on missile-related transfers may yet have the desired effect.(69)
The United States is not the only country to use sanctions for nonproliferation purposes. The Japanese link overseas development assistance to, among other things, “trends in recipient countries’ military expenditures, their development and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc.”(70) The Japanese froze grant aid to China after Beijing broke the moratorium on nuclear testing in 1995. They also sanctioned India and Pakistan for nuclear weapons tests in 1998, as did Germany and other countries, following the U.S. lead.(71) No one besides the United States has sanctioned countries for trading specifically in missiles or missile-related technology–not even the Japanese. However, Tokyo for a time suspended financial support for North Korea’s nuclear reactors to be built in accordance with the Agreed Framework, cut off talks to resume normal diplomatic relations, halted food assistance, and temporarily terminated flights to North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s test of a Taepo Dong I as a space launch vehicle last year. In response to concerns that the North Koreans might test the longer range Taepo Dong II, some leaders in the Diet have moved to pass legislation that would suspend the remittances that Koreans living in Japan send to their families in North Korea. Such a cutoff would be a considerable blow to the cash-strapped economy of North Korea if Pyongyang again tested a so-called space launch vehicle.
Missile proliferation concerns figure in other U.S. multilateral agreements. For example, the U.S.–Japan Supercomputer or High Performance Computer Agreement reviews powerful computers for missile proliferation implications, as well as other WMD, conventional weapons development, and related military development concerns.(72) In the Wassenaar Arrangement, thirty-three countries, including former members of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, control missile-related technology not covered by the MTCR. The organization’s objective is to “prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses, if the situation in the region or the behavior of a state is, or becomes a cause for serious concern to the participating states.”(73) Although Wassenaar is not yet as strong a regime as other nonproliferation regimes, it is the first to cover conventional armaments and advanced conventional weapons technology in the Third World. In regard to missile proliferation, Wassenaar covers tactical missiles not included in the MTCR but that in some instances share similar technology. For example, if China were a member of Wassenaar, it would not be able to transfer tactical missiles or related technology., including CSS-8s, C801/802 anti-ship missiles, or Silkworms, to the rogue states of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.(74) As it stands, the Chinese have transferred 150-kilometer-range CSS-8 ground-to-ground missiles as well as these other missiles at various times to Iran. Such missiles are not covered by MTCR guidelines unless they are intended for WMD use,(75) although their technology, such as rocket fuel production capabilities, can be used for missiles of MTCR concern. Moreover, membership in Wassenaar is conditioned on adherence to the other international control regimes, including the MTCR, which has encouraged some countries that wished to join Wassenaar to adhere to or join the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Australia Group (which covers chemical-biological weapons).(76) A country that adheres to a nonproliferation regime agrees to implement the controls for that regime as other members do, but it does not otherwise participate in the regime.
The United States also participates in bilateral and multilateral exchanges on export controls to help other countries implement or encourage controls for WMD-related technology, including missiles. For example, Japan, in cooperation with the United States and Australia, hosts the annual Asian Export Control Seminar, which brings together countries from ASEAN, China (the mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), Mongolia, and Papua New Guinea for an informal exchange of views on export controls. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, have held bilateral exchanges on nonproliferation and export controls, including MTCR-related controls. The growth of regional security dialogues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and informal government/academic meetings like the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, also present opportunities to promote nonproliferation norms and export controls, including missile controls.
Finally, the United States has engaged in military confrontation in regard to nonproliferation threats. Although the Gulf War was more about Baghdad’s invasion of Kuwait than nonproliferation, the conflict not only raised the spectre of WMD threats, particularly chemical-biological weapons, but actually involved the use of SCUDs for both military and political purposes. After Iraq’s defeat, Baghdad was required to give up its WMD programs and missile delivery systems with a range above 150 kilometers. Indeed, Iraq’s violation of the nonproliferation conditions of the ceasefire by frustrating UNSCOM inspections has led to intermittent air conflict and recent air strikes on Iraq. But now that Baghdad has banished UNSCOM inspectors, Iraq is largely free to revive its WMD programs and reconstitute its missile projects. In a sense, the United States has moved from nonproliferation efforts in Iraq to counterproliferation ones intended to destroy Iraq’s WMD and missile capabilities–in other words, nonproliferation by other means.
Of course, there are measures short of military action that the United States can take to enforce nonproliferation norms, such as military-related threats or increased ground, naval, and air deployments in the region of the threat, supported by the United Nations and/or U.S. allies. For example, the United States deployed increased naval forces near the Korean peninsula during the crisis over Pyongyang’s refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect its civil nuclear research/ power program and its threat to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The crisis ended with the North Koreans signing the Agreed Framework to ameliorate international suspicions that they were developing nuclear weapons. Although concerns continue regarding North Korean nuclear weapons development, military-related threats did help resolve the crisis; similar actions affected even Iraqi willingness to accommodate inspections before the current confrontation. The United States and other countries should be prepared to enforce nonproliferation norms the way Great Britain implemented its antislavery laws in the nineteenth century, using military force to interdict the slave trade regardless of the interests of other countries.(77)
As a result of rising missile tensions, interest in acquiring or developing antimissile systems has intensified. India may obtain an antimissile system from Russia or Israel while it steps up development of its Akash surface-to-air missile, with antimissile capabilities.(78) Egypt was also looking to Russia for an antimissile system, and Turkey may be interested in Israel’s Arrow system. Taiwan was developing a tactical antimissile system based on the Patriot. And, of course, North Korea’s testing of the Taepo Dong I as a space launch vehicle has forced the Japanese to reconsider their earlier decision to forego joint development of a theater missile defense system with the United States.(79)
Antimissile systems, however, are a double-edged sword; they may provide increased protection from missile attack and perhaps an alternative to offensive ballistic missile development, but they can also increase tensions. On the positive side, Patriot antimissile systems helped the Israelis endure Baghdad’s missile attack during the Gulf War without striking back. Israeli retaliation might have damaged the effort against Iraq because Arab states in the coalition would not have wanted to seem to be on the same side as Israel. Moreover, missile defenses provide Japan, Korea, and possibly Taiwan an alternative to developing offensive missile capabilities of MTCR concern. In the past, the United States restrained South Korea’s missile development efforts by negotiating a bilateral agreement that Seoul’s missile capabilities would be well below MTCR parameters; Washington also acted to stop Taiwan’s development of SLV capability that could have provided the infrastructure for a ballistic missile program.(80) On the negative side, Russia’s sale of surface-to-air missiles to Cyprus provoked Turkey into becoming interested in obtaining ballistic missile and antimissile capabilities. China has warned against the deployment of theater missile defense systems in Asia, especially any that would involve Taiwan. Such warnings may have been a consideration in Japan’s decision to forego the acquisition of a theater missile defense system until North Korea tested its SLV in 1998.(81) Indeed, the Chinese have threatened that antimissile systems will spark a new arms race. At a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva in late March 1999, Chinese president Jiang Zemin said that
the research, development, deployment and proliferation of sophisticated
antimissile systems and the revision of, or even withdrawal from, the
existing disarmament treaties on which global strategic equilibrium hinges,
will inevitably exert an extensive negative impact on international
security and stability and trigger off a new round of arms race in new
North Korea’s testing of a space launch vehicle also called into question the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate judgment that Washington would have ample warning of the development of a missile threat to the continental United States; at the same time it confirmed the Rumsfeld Report’s contention that the threat to the United States was growing and spurred Congress and the administration to emphasize the development of a national missile defense system. This, in turn, would require modification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Moscow, and in a trip to Russia early in 1999, Secretary of State Madeline Albright began to lay the groundwork for doing so.(83) However, the Russians have remained cool to the idea of modifying the ABM Treaty, despite this and subsequent appeals.(84) The Chinese, alarmed by talk of theater and national missile defenses, apparently proposed that the ABM Treaty be multilateralized and suggested that they would not join the MTCR (and even might reconsider observing MTCR regulations) if Washington insisted on going ahead with missile defenses.(85)
However, as we have seen, Russia and China are among the worst offenders regarding international norms for controlling ballistic missile proliferation, especially in the Mideast. Indeed, some believe that the Chinese have assisted North Korea’s missile program, and North Korean defectors have testified that North Korea’s missile scientists were trained in the Soviet Union.(86) One could argue that Moscow and Beijing are reaping the fruits of proliferation that they failed to control. In fact, China and Russia have been primary beneficiaries of U.S. efforts to restrain missile proliferation globally. Certainly, neither Moscow nor Beijing would like to see Germany and Japan obtain long-range missile capabilities. If the possibility of missile defenses at the very least convince Russian and Chinese leaders of the need to control missile proliferation, then they will have served a useful purpose. The prospect of antimissile systems may also help secure Moscow’s and Beijing’s aid to deal with ongoing programs in North Korea, South Asia, and the Mideast.
That will be a difficult tightrope to walk: The United States needs missile defenses to protect itself, its forces, friends, and allies from rogue states and others, but it must be careful not to spark an arms race with Russia and China or further assist in missile proliferation. Moscow and Beijing have much to gain by cooperating, because the limited missile defenses currently envisioned will have little impact on their deterrent capabilities. If the missile threat in the Third World continues to increase, however, the United States could pursue much greater antimissile capabilities, including space-based systems. Thus, Russia and China have potentially much to lose if they fail to cooperate with the United States and other countries controlling missile proliferation. Moreover, if there is an arms race with the United States, who do the Russians and Chinese think will win?
North Korea’s testing of the Taepo Dong I as a space launch vehicle highlighted the fact that the United States and other members of the Missile Technology Control Regime cannot restrain a state determined to acquire a ballistic or cruise missile capability. Through export controls and other measures the United States can frustrate, delay, and raise the cost of a proliferant’s program, but it cannot prevent it entirely. In the past, those engaged in missile nonproliferation believed that U.S. efforts bought time to bring about a diplomatic solution, as was the case with Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. That may still be the case, as Washington has ongoing negotiations with many of the most dangerous proliferant nations, including North Korea, India, and Pakistan (although not Iran). However, there are limits to diplomacy, and it could be that missile nonproliferation is now useful in buying time to pursue missile defense and increased counterproliferation capabilities. Missile defenses and counterproliferation capabilities could even reinforce diplomacy by rendering the missile programs of proliferants less effective as weapons of war and intimidation.
Indeed, missile defenses may encourage some proliferant states to give up their missile programs in exchange for support of their SLV programs, which could, in turn, make the spread of SLV programs less threatening. That is a tradeoff that many in the United States and elsewhere see as too risky because of the similarity between offensive missile systems and space launch vehicles. But it may not be too risky in the future if the United States has robust national and theater missile defenses for itself, its allies, and its forces in the field.
For further information on this subject, see the reports of the workshops and conferences sponsored by the Center for Global Security Research in 1999, on “Missile Proliferation in an Age of Advancing Technology,” written and organized by Dr. Weiss, at .
(1.) For a description of the Taepo Dong as a space launch vehicle, see Robert D. Walpole, speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 17 September 1998.
(2.) The Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998, hereafter referred to as the Rumsfeld Report (named for the commission’s chairman, former secretary of defense Donald H. Rumsfeld); Central Intelligence Agency, Emerging Missile Threats to North America during the Next 15 Years, National Intelligence Estimate 95-19.
(3.) For an inside view of the origins of the MTCR, see Richard H. Speier, “The Missile Technology Control Regime: Case Study of a Multilateral Negotiation,” United States Institute of Peace Grant #SG-31-95, Washington, D.C., 1995.
(4.) National Air Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 1998, NAIC-1031-0985-98; Department of Defense, Proliferation, April 1996.
(5.) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), “The Missile Technology Control Regime,” fact sheet, 15 September 1997.
(6.) ACDA, “The Missile Technology Control Guidelines,” fact sheet, 11 June 1996.
(7.) For MTCR Guidelines, see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines,” 11 June 1996.
(8.) National Air Intelligence Center, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” 1998, NAIC-1031-0985-98.
(9.) Jansatta (Delhi), 15 July 1997, in Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies Database, hereafter MIIS/CNSD.
(10.) Washington Post, 3 June 1997, in MIIS/CNSD.
(11.) The Rumsfeld Report, 14.
(12.) The last launch of the Agni medium-range ballistic missile was in early 1994. The Agni was termed a “technology demonstrator.” India Today, 15 April 1994, in MIIS/CNSD.
(13.) The sources are unclear as to whether a Shaheen I short-range ballistic missile or Ghauri II medium-range ballistic missile was tested in response to India’s test of Agni II. William Schneider, Jr., “Testimony on Iran’s Activities Relating to Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” Washington, D.C., 20 April 1999. It is also unclear whether the Shaheen is the same missile as the Tarmuk, although they seem to have similar capabilities. See Washington Post, 12 April 1999; Washington Post, 13 April 1999; New York Times, 14 April 1999.
(14.) Nation (Islamabad), 16 May 1994, in MIIS/CNSD; Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 December 1994; Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 January 1995, in MIIS/CNSD.
(15.) Washington Post, 25 September 1997, in MIIS/CNSD.
(16.) Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation: Chinese Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 39, 45.
(17.) Schneider, “Testimony.”
(18.) Schneider, “Testimony”; Kenneth Timmerman, “Trumped by Iran’s New Missile,” Washington Times, 5 May 1999. See also Rumsfeld Report, 18, for alternative basing modes such as sea-based ballistic missile systems.
(19.) Arms Control Today (June/July 1998): 26.
(20.) Yeni Yuzyi (Istanbul), 16 September 1997, in MIIS/CNSD; Sabah (Istanbul), 4 October 1997, in MIIS/CNSD; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 June 1997, in MIIS/CNSD.
(21.) Ibid. Military. Procurement International, 15 May 1997, in MIIS/CNSD.
(22.) Washington Times, 2 December 1996, in MIIS/CNSD; Korea Times (Seoul), 1 January 1997.
(23.) Taipei had some interest in ballistic missiles in the early 1990s. See Los Angeles Times, 19 February 1991. For China’s missile exercises in the Taiwan Straits, see the China section of U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation, June 1998.
(24.) BBC Panorama, 89, in MIIS/CNSD.
(25.) See Egypt section, Director of Central Intelligence, Nonproliferation Center, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January-30 June 1998. The CIA also claims that Egypt continues to develop and produce SCUD Bs and SCUD Cs as well as the Vector.
(26.) For Israel’s concern regarding the Condor program, see BBC Panorama, 89, in MIIS/CNSD; Nuclear Developments, 25 April 1989, in MIIS/CNSD; and Nuclear Developments, 23 May 1989, in MIIS/CNSD. For Israel’s involvement in South Africa’s missile development program, see Washington Post, 27 October 1989, in MIIS/CNSD.
(27.) Economist, 23 March 1991, in MIIS/CNSD.
(28.) Defense News, 17-23 February 1997, in MIIS/CNSD; Defense News, 24 February-2 March 1997, in MIIS/CNSD; Hindustan Times (Delhi), 13 February 1997, 13, in MIIS/CNSD. Israel’s concern about Russian aid to Iran’s Shahab 4 program apparently does not extend to defense business. See Defense News, 22-28 September 1997, in MIIS/CNSD.
(29.) Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress; Rumsfeld Report; Department of Defense, Proliferation, June 1998.
(30.) Rumsfeld Report, 8-9; Department of Defense, Proliferation, June 1998; Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 91-101.
(31.) CISAC, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 73-74, 93-94, 96-98; Dinshaw Mistry, “India’s Emerging Space Program,” Pacific Affairs 71, no. 2 (summer 1998): 151-52.
(32.) For example, BBC Panorama, 89, in MIIS/CNSD; Nuclear Developments, 23 May 1989, 2, in MIIS/CNSD.
(33.) For example, Ukraine might fall under U.S. sanctions, according to Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 December 1996, in MIIS/CNSD.
(34.) Ibid. See also U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political Military Affairs, “Report on the Seminar on Transshipment Issues: Missile Technology Control Regime,” 15-17 July 1996.
(35.) Director of Central Intelligence, Nonproliferation Center, Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997.
(36.) Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress, January-June 1998.
(37.) This is a conclusion based on a variety of sources. See CISAC, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 73-75; Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 16-20; National Air Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NAIC-1031-0985-98; Zakheim, “Old Rivalries, New Arsenals”; Rumsfeld Report; Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996; Department of Defense, Proliferation, June 1998.
(38.) See the Western nations section of CIA, Report to Congress, January-June 1998.
(39.) Schneider, “Testimony”; CIA, Report to Congress, January-June 1998.
(40.) CIA, Report to Congress, January-June 1998.
(41.) The Rumsfeld Report, 16, notes the relaxation of U.S. export controls, the availability of information on ballistic missile development, foreign student training, and the illegal acquisition of technology from the United States.
(42.) See the cruise missile section in the “Technical Annex on Accessible Technologies,” in Department of Defense, Proliferation, April 1996.
(43.) For North Korea, see Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 January 1994, in MIIS/CNSD. For China, see Defense News, 9-15 December 1996, in MIIS/CNSD. For India, see Times of India (Bombay), 25 December 1996, 6, in MIIS/CNSD.
(44.) See the supporting technologies section in Department of Defense, Proliferation, April 1996. See also Bob Preston, Plowshares and Power: The Military, Use of Civil Space (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), for an extensive discussion of the implications of commercial space for U.S. national security interests.
(45.) Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 October 1994, in MIIS/CNSD; Xinhua (Beijing), 18 July 1997, in MIIS/CNSD.
(46.) See the supporting technologies section in Department of Defense, Proliferation, April 1996. See also Preston, Plowshares and Power.
(47.) Preston, Plowshares and Power.
(48.) For example, Space News, 11 December 1995; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 15 January 1996; Space News, 27 May 1996-2 June 1996; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 June 1996; Flight International, 12 June 1996-18 June 1996; Space News, 8-14 July 1996; Space News, 3-9 February 1997; Space News, 19-25 May 1997; Space News, 7-13 July 1997, all in MIIS/CNSD.
(49.) See the report of the workshop on “Commercial and Military Space Launch,” April 1999, Washington, D.C., organized by Kenneth G. Weiss, available at . See also Mark Cazeres’s report in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 January 1998, and Aerospace Industries Association, “Satellite Launch Fact Sheet,” June 1998.
(50.) Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 January 1998.
(51.) C. Michael Armstrong and Steven D. Dorfman, “Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,” 29 July 1998. Armstrong was the chairman and CEO of AT&T and chairman of the President’s Export Council, and Steven D. Dorfman was vice chairman of Hughes Electronic Corporation.
(52.) Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 January 1998.
(53.) Ray Finucane, conversation with author, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California, May 1998.
(54.) Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 January 1998, in MIIS/CNSD. Korea Focus, January-February 1997, in MIIS/CNSD.
(55.) For Australia, see Space News, 25-31 March 1996, in MIIS/CNSD. For Germany, inter alia, see Space News, 4-10 November 1996, in MIIS/CNSD.
(56.) For an extensive study of this issue, see Kenneth G. Weiss, “Space Is Red: Missile Proliferation, Commercial Space Cooperation, and China,” Center for Global Security Research Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-JC-133502/ CGSR-99-001, January 1999.
(58.) ACDA, “Commonly Asked Questions on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),” fact sheet, 26 November 1997.
(59.) U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political Military Affairs, “Report on the Seminar on Transshipment Issues.”
(60.) Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, 30 April 1990, in MIIS/CNSD; Clarin (Buenos Aires), 25 April 1990, in MIIS/CNSD.
(61.) For Brazil, see Reuters News Service, 29 August 1996, in MIIS/CNSD; Deft, rise News, 18-24 September 1995, in MIIS/CNSD; Arms Sales Monitor, 5 December 1995, in MIIS/CNSD. For South Africa, see Reuters News Service, 30 June 1993, in MIIS/CNSD.
(62.) Department of Defense, Proliferation, June 1998.
(63.) ACDA, “The Missile Technology Control Guidelines,” fact sheet, 11 June 1996.
(64.) The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1990-1991 (Public Law 101-510) amended the Arms Export Control Act (Public Law 90-629) and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-72). See also United States General Accounting Office, “Export Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items,” GAO/NSIAD-97-24, January 1997, 15.
(65.) Weiss, “Space Is Red.”
(67.) Alexander A. Pikayev, Leonard S. Spector, Elina V. Kirichenko, and Ryan Gibson, “Russia, the U.S. and the Missile Technology Control Regime,” Adelphi Paper 317, 1998. One analyst believes that the sanctions have not delayed the GSLV program because the first rockets will use Russian-supplied engines. However, limitations on Russian technical assistance may have made it more difficult to integrate the engines with the rocket. Mistry, “India’s Emerging Space Program,” 159.
(68.) For South Africa, see African Confidential, 10 January 1992, in MIIS/CNSD. For Israel, see Washington Post, 4 October 1991, in MIIS/CNSD; Washington Post, 27 October 1991, in MIIS/CNSD. 69. Weiss, “Space Is Red.”
(70.) Government of Japan, “The ODA Charter,” ODA Summary., 11996.
(71.) Ibid. For an extensive account of the crisis in South Asia, see Kenneth G. Weiss, “Crossroads: Nonproliferation, South Asia, and Global Stability,” Center for Global Security Research Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-JC-131739/CGSR-98-003, October 1998.
(72.) For the origins of the U.S.–Japan Supercomputer Agreement, see Stephen D. Bryen, “Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy, 1981-1988, for the Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate,” 11 June 1997.
(73.) Wassenaar Arrangement, “The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,” press release, July 1996.
(74.) Robert J. Einhorn, “Prepared Statement of Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State for the Hearing before Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate,” 10 April 1997.
(75.) See Iran section of Department of Defense, Proliferation, June 1998.
(76.) Wassenaar Arrangement, “The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls.”
(77.) See Department of Defense, Proliferation, June 1998; Department of Defense, Proliferation, April 1996; Weiss, “Crossroads.”
(78.) Jane’s International Defense Review (January 1997): 4, in MIIS/CNSD.
(79.) Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 September 1998; New York Times, 22 January 1999.
(80.) Jane’s Intelligence Review (December 1996): 560-64, in MIIS/CNSD; Arms Control Today (December 1995–January 1996): 25, in MIIS/ CNSD; Washington Times, 2 December 1996; Proliferation Watch (November-December 1990): 15, in MIIS/CNSD; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22 October 1990, in MIIS/CNSD.
(81.) Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 September 1998; New York Times, 22 January 1999.
(82.) Reuters News Service, 28 March 1998.
(83.) Washington Post, 21 January 1999; New York Times, 21 January 1999.
(84.) New York Times, 26 January 1999.
(85.) New York Times, 12 February 1999.
(86.) Anthony Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 91-92. See the testimony of North Korean defectors in “Heating before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate,” 21 October 1997.
Kenneth G. Weiss is a consultant for the Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This article expands on a briefing delivered at the Theater Missile Defense Conference, in Edinburgh, Scotland, 3 June 1999. The author wishes to thank Glenn Pomykal and Ollie Loper, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, for their assistance. This article represents only the opinions of the author. It does not represent the views of the Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the University of California, the U.S. Department of Energy, or any other agency or department of the U.S. government.
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