Evaluating the efficacy of the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia: implications for criminology and international criminal law

Evaluating the efficacy of the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia: implications for criminology and international criminal law

George Yacoubian, S., Jr.

The Armenian massacres of 1915 are widely considered the first principal genocide of the twentieth century. (1) During the second half of the nineteenth century, Armenia fell under the rule of the Ottoman Turks. In 1908, the Young Turks overthrew the old regime and adopted “a credo based on pan-Turanism, which alleged a prehistoric mythic unity among Turanian peoples based on racial origin to be implemented by `Turkification.'” (2) Motivated by a feverish sense of jingoism, the Young Turks sought an empire that stretched from Central Asia to China. Between 1908 and 1914, the seemingly egalitarian Young Turks became xenophobic nationalists bent on eliminating the Armenian people.

By the end of April 1915, the stage had been set for the Armenian massacres. Men, women, and children were walked to secluded areas and murdered outright. Those who were not killed immediately found death by deportation. As Dadrian stated, “The Ottoman authorities ordered … the wholesale deportation of the Armenian population of the empire’s Eastern and Southeastern provinces?” (3) By the time the killings had been completed, more than 1.5 million Armenians had been slaughtered, and the Armenian question in Eastern Anatolia had been resolved.

At the time of the Armenian massacres, neither the crime nor the definition of genocide had been developed. As Yacoubian stated, “there were certain rules of war to protect civilian populations, but these regulations failed to cover a government’s persecution of its own people.” (4) The term “genocide” was developed in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin to denote “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” (5) Lemkin’s efforts culminated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (6) which officially came into effect as a binding piece of international law on 12 January 1951. Today, 130 states have ratified or acceded to the convention, including all member states of the European Union (EU) and all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (SC). Article II of the Genocide Convention declares genocide to mean,

the commitment of any of the following acts

with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a

national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as

such:

a) Killing members of the group;

b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to

members of the group;

c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions

of life calculated to bring about its physical

destruction in whole or in part;

d) Imposing measures intended to prevent

births within the group; and

e) Forcibly transferring children of the group

to another group.

No state has ever asserted that genocide is not a crime, and the definition contained in Article II is considered to be binding international law.

Despite the ratification of the Genocide Convention, genocide has been perpetrated repeatedly during the last four decades. “Its contemporary manifestation has indicated a capacity for atrocity on an unprecedented scale.” (7) Victimized groups include 400,000 civilians in the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1974; (8) more than 1 million Bengali in Bangladesh in 1971; (9) 150,000 Hutu in Burundi in 1972; (10) 1.5 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979; (11) 200,000 Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the Former Yugoslavia in 1992; (12) and 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. (13) Genocidal events in both Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia ultimately yielded responses from the global legal community in the form of international criminal tribunals. The genocidal events, and the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are discussed below.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

The popular but dangerously simplistic version of Rwanda’s catastrophe is that it was a savage eruption of tribal rivalry. This description erroneously allows the international community to shrug off not only its complexity, but also its significance to the development of international criminal law. What happened in Rwanda illustrates a situation where the coexistence of different social groups evolved into political problems with overwhelmingly racial dimensions. As Destexhe affirmed, “Archaic political divisions were progressively transformed into racial ideologies … which then brought them into the political arena.” (14)

During the first decade of the twentieth century, Germany colonized the region of Africa that now encompasses Rwanda and Burundi. The colonizers identified three ethnic groups that inhabited the area: the Twa, who were the original denizens; the Hutu, who entered the area during the fourth and seventh centuries A.D.; and the Tutsi, who were the newest inhabitants. Following the First World War, the colonies were taken over by Belgium, at which time the Tutsi were the more dominant group, despite larger numbers of Hutu.

Three years before Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962, a Hutu uprising resulted in the deaths of more than 150,000 Tutsi refugees fleeing the country. The Belgians, responding to pressures for democratization within its colonies, supported the Hutu. Although evidence exists to suggest cacophony between the Hutu and Tutsi prior to Belgian rule, colonial intervention greatly exacerbated the difficulties. By favoring the Tutsi throughout colonial rule, and then supporting the Hutu coup, ethnic tensions were heightened, ultimately leaving behind conditions that led to genocide.

The Hutu party, and its leader General Juvenal Habyarimana, came to power in 1973 through this military coup. For the next twenty years, Hutu rule dominated Rwanda. Although Habyarimana claimed to have established a nation of balanced resources and job distribution, the president and his National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development ruled Rwanda as a one-party state. Throughout Habyarimana’s rule, Rwandan Tutsi in neighboring countries tried to return to their homeland, but were denied repatriation. On 1 October 1990, however, approximately four thousand Rwandan fighters entered northern Rwanda from Uganda. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), comprised mainly of Tutsi who had fled Rwanda years before, demanded democracy and power sharing from what they claimed was a corrupt Habyarimana regime. Although several concessions were made to Tutsi rebels, the government’s more extreme Hutu elements became more organized and took steps to consolidate their power. In response to the overwhelming political frustration, Tutsi rebels attacked President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994. Everyone on board was killed. The annihilation of all Tutsi began instantaneously. By July, Hutu soldiers, police officers, and militia members, recurrently aided by civilians, had killed approximately 800,000 Tutsi in several well-coordinated waves of mass killing. (15)

The crisis in Rwanda was seen exclusively as a humanitarian catastrophe affecting hundred of thousands of refugees, eliciting international compassion, but distracting attention from the genocide that had already run its course. As Destexhe affirmed, “humanitarian action provided a way of responding to the crisis while continuing to conveniently overlook the fact that a genocide had taken place until the situation had evolved to the point where it could be forgotten altogether.” (16) In a belated response to the atrocities, the SC established a Commission of Experts in July 1994 to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda. (17) In its first interim report, the commission concluded that, “there exists overwhelming evidence to prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi groups were perpetrated by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, systematic, and methodical way,” and that, “abundant evidence shows that these mass exterminations perpetrated by Hutu elements against the Tutsi group as such … constitute `genocide’ within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.” (18) Furthermore, the commission strongly recommended that the SC take action to “ensure that the individuals responsible [be] … brought to justice before an independent and impartial international criminal tribunal.” (19) Having confirmed that genocide and other flagrant violations of international humanitarian law had been committed, the SC established the ICTR (20) at Arusha, Tanzania, in 1994.

The international community has relied on five ways of responding to violations of international criminal law: 1) doing nothing; 2) granting amnesty; 3) creating a truth commission; 4) domestic prosecutions; and 5) creating ad hoc international tribunals. (21) Article VI of the Genocide Convention states that, “persons charged with genocide … shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” As such, two options exist to prosecute accused genocidal perpetrators. Domestic officials can prosecute internally individuals accused of genocidal behavior, or the United Nations may convene ad hoc criminal tribunals. To date, four such international tribunals have been convened: the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) in 1945, (22) the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo (IMTFE) in 1946, (23) the ICTY at The Hague in 1992, (24) and the ICTR. By the judgment of the IMT, eleven Nazis were sentenced to death and seven to prison. (25) In Tokyo, two premiers and five generals were put to death. (26)

The creation of the ICTR supported Rwandan efforts to allocate individual responsibility for genocide and other crimes against humanity by offering an objective forum for investigating genocidal events. The SC decided to create the ICTR to bring to justice those persons responsible for acts of genocide and violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda between 1 January and 31 December 1994. (27) As such, the ICTR is authorized to prosecute four clusters of offenses: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide; and crimes against humanity. (28)

In 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia seceded from the Yugoslav Federation (Serbia and Montenegro). (29) Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Muslin-dominated enclave, is surrounded by Croatia to the North and Serbia to the East. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s population is primarily a mix of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, all of whom define ethnicity according to religious affiliation. Animosity has always existed between these three groups. (30) As a result of this conflict, civil war erupted in Bosnia during summer 1991 as the Croats and Serbs wanted to create their own nation-states.

Genocide quickly became a facet of the war. (31) Occurring first during spring 1992, Serbian forces initiated extensive ethnic cleansing against both the Muslims and the Croats. The practice of ethnic cleansing was not limited to Serbs, as both the Croats and Muslims occasionally committed such acts. Their ethnic cleansing, however, was primarily retaliatory in nature. (32) Consequently, ethnic cleansing became the direct cause of most human rights violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (33)

The European Community (EC) responded quickly to Yugoslavia’s outbreak of violence in 1991. (34) Unable to resolve the dispute peacefully and non-militarily, the EC requested assistance from the Security Council. Subsequent to this request, the SC attempted to facilitate a peaceful solution and imposed on all states a duty of nonintervention. (35) Because Serbian forces rejected a peaceful settlement to the conflict, several steps were taken by the United Nations. First, the UN passed Resolution 713, which imposed an arms embargo on all parties to the conflict. (36) Second, the SC created a peacekeeping force to provide humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. (37) Third, the SC adopted Resolution 752, requiting all parties to cooperate in peacekeeping negotiations. (38) Because warring factions failed to comply, the SC passed Resolution 757, which imposed strict economic sanctions. (39) In July 1992, the SC passed a resolution reaffirming that people who commit breaches of humanitarian law are individually responsible for those acts. (40) Because reports of widespread human rights violations continued, the SC strongly condemned the practice of ethnic cleaning and demanded that all parties desist from that activity. In October 1992, the SC voted unanimously to create the ICTY to collect evidence of human rights violations and determine who should be prosecuted. (41) While the ICTY was originally established as an enforcement measure, it also has served a judicial function, allowing it to prosecute individuals for the crime of genocide regardless of a state’s acquiescence to the Genocide Convention. (42)

EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF THE ICTR AND ICTY

In this section, I evaluate the efficacy of the ICTR and ICTY in terms of four specific outcomes: time, monetary costs, advancement of international criminal law enforcement, and usefulness for criminological exploration. They are each addressed sequentially below.

Time

As shown in table 1, the ICTR has indicted fifty-two persons to date, with the first trials having begun during spring 1997. Of the fifty-two indictees, nine (17 percent) trials have been completed, (43) while seventeen (33 percent) are currently on trial. Twenty-six individuals (50 percent) are awaiting trial. Similarly, the ICTY has indicted eighty-seven persons to date (see table 2). Of the eighty-seven indictees, twenty-three (26 percent) trials have been completed, (44) while thirty-one (36 percent) are awaiting trial. Twenty-seven individuals (31 percent) have yet to be arrested, while charges against six (7 percent) have been dismissed.

One of the biggest criticisms of both tribunals has been the relative lack of production, in terms of indictments and convictions, since their inception. (45) These data evidence this criticism. During the seven-year span of the ICTR, only nine trials have been completed, which computes to an average of slightly more than one a year. Similarly, the ICTY has yielded twenty-three completed trials in nine years, an average of 2.5 trials per year. Given the number of indictees still outstanding, these tribunals could, theoretically, be prosecuting offenders for the next several decades.

Monetary Costs

As shown in table 3, expenditures for the ICTR since 1995 have been approximately $410 million, which computes to $8 million per indictment and $45.5 million per conviction. Expenditures for the ICTY since 1993 have been approximately $471 million, an average of $5.5 million per indictment and $22.5 million per conviction. In comparison, the average cost per capital case in the United States is approximately $2 million. (46) It is thus twenty times more expensive to prosecute (but not incarcerate) a genocidal perpetrator in the ICTR, and ten times more expensive in the ICTY, than it is to convict and execute a murderer in the United States.

Advancement of International Criminal law Enforcement

The ICTR and ICTY were convened, in part, to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of modern international criminal law in action. A permanent international criminal court (ICC) was considered at the end of the First World War, and again after Nuremberg, but was shelved until 1989. (47) During summer 1998, delegates from most of the world’s nations met in Rome to negotiate a statute to create a permanent ICC. By an unrecorded vote, 120 nations (including all EU states) were in favor, seven were opposed, and twenty-one abstained. (48) It has since been signed by ninety-two states. There were five major elements to the Rome Statute: (a) the ICC would work only when national courts were unable or unwilling to prosecute (principle of complementarity); (b) it was limited to prosecuting four offenses: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; (c) the prosecutor of the ICC can start investigations on his/her own initiative (propio motu); (d) the ICC has absolute jurisdiction, which means that the court can exercise its jurisdiction if either the state of which the conduct in question occurred or the state of which the person accused of the crime is a national to a party to the statute; and (e) the SC can refer situations to the ICC and can request the Court hold an investigation or prosecution for a period of twelve months. (49) While there was general consensus that the ICC would be useful, the real issue involved deciding how it would work.

Modern international criminal law has established beyond any doubt that crimes as serious as genocide are the concern of the international community. The issue yet to be determined, however, is whether the international community must act collectively to bring serious violators of genocide and other serious crimes to justice (through the development of temporary or permanent international criminal courts), or whether states should be individually responsible for enforcing international criminal law. If the organizational pitfalls that have characterized the ICTR and ICTY evidence future international proceedings, the international community should strongly consider assuming individual state responsibility for the prosecution of these offenses.

Usefulness for Criminological Exploration

Genocide is the gravest crime against humanity, often eliciting an emotional reaction unmatched by other acts of violence. As I stated earlier, “no criminal activity matches it in the moral ignominy that it generates.” (50) Acts of genocide become even more opprobrious when one considers the irreconcilable quantity of human casualties. During the twentieth century alone, fifteen million lives have been lost to acts of genocide. This computes to more than four hundred victims a day over the course of the century, making genocide the most perilous act of violence known to man, when measured in human lives. Unfortunately, however, these acts of violence have not translated into academic attention of the phenomenon within the discipline of criminology. With the exception of Friedrichs, (51) Day and Vandiver, (52) Laufer, (53) Yacoubian, (54) Alvarez, (55) Hagan, (56) and Friedrichs, (57) however, the nexus between genocide and criminology remains unexplored.

These works symbolize efforts to move the discipline of criminology beyond the mainstream and embrace acts of violence that, to date, have been virtually ignored by criminologists. Given the physical and financial damage caused by the crime of genocide, its lack of representation within literature devoted to the discipline of criminology is both curious and unfortunate. As Alvarez stated, “scholars have attempted to elucidate the phenomenon of genocide by drawing on political, legal, historical, and psychological explanations,” but “have ignored the large body of theory and research developed to explain criminal acts and actors, even though this accumulated knowledge clearly applies to genocide.” (58)

In my conclusion, I eluded to two potential benefits of linking genocidal behavior to the discipline of criminology: the testing of criminological theories and the advancement of penal theory. (59) Although the work of Alvarez (60) represented the first attempt to link criminological theory to the crime of genocide, it was purely theoretical in nature. To date, no quantitative research has been undertaken to link genocide and criminological theory. The present state of genocidal affairs, however, makes such an endeavor possible. Because theories of criminal behavior have been tested empirically with incarcerated populations, replicating such tests with genocidal perpetrators is certainly possible. It is recognized, however that empirical work with such populations would be a difficult assignment. Obstacles with facility access, language barriers, and funding limitations would necessarily have to be addressed to initiate such an endeavor properly. Nevertheless, if the scope of a criminological theory is a criterion by which it is assessed, (61) a study that seeks to extend the scope of one or several theories would seem to be a worthwhile endeavor.

Given the number of sentenced genocidal perpetrators, (62) and the number of those prosecutions still pending, penal recommendations for the international criminal justice system are also possible. To date, sentences imposed on genocidal perpetrators have been guided solely by principles of retribution. (63) While harsh prison sentences may, to some extent, diffuse the emotional charge associated with acts of genocide, they do not promote a rational sentencing system. The principles of utilitarianism and reparation should also be considered when an offender is sentenced for acts of genocide. Incorporating criminological perspectives of penal theory and sentencing policy can certainly impact the international criminal justice system.

The discipline of criminology is one characterized by evolution. Recent innovations in correctional policies and the rejuvenation of previously dismissed criminological theories evidence this natural process of growth and change. If the pitfalls of stagnation are to be avoided, it is of the utmost importance that those crimes causing the most damage be embraced as potentially valuable to the discipline of criminology.

DISCUSSION

Genocide is distinguishable from all other crimes by the motivation behind it. Toward the end of the Second World War, when the full horror of the Third Reich had been revealed, Winston Churchill stated that the world was being brought face to face with a “crime that has no name.” Indeed, history was of little use in finding a recognized word to fit the nature of the crime in which Nazi Germany–a modern, industrialized state–had engaged. There simply were no precedents with respect to either the nature or the degree of the crime.

Although the establishment of the ICTR and ICTY were monumental international endeavors, they have strained, both financially and logistically, the capabilities of the United Nations. Expenditures for the ICTR since 1995 have been approximately $410 million, which computes to $45.5 million per genocidal conviction. Total expenditures for the ICTY have been approximately $471 million, an average cost of $22.5 million per conviction. Because of the number of victimizers still awaiting trial, and the inability of the ICTR and ICTY to prosecute expeditiously, the tribunals should be viewed as organizational nightmares and legal failures. Given these distressing examples, the international community should reconsider the creation of a permanent international criminal court. Rather, domestic successes in Rwanda indicate that individual states should step forward to prosecute accused genocidal perpetrators. (64)

There can be no dispute that consistent enforcement of the Genocide Convention is imperative to the deliverance of international criminal justice. “The preservation of a peaceful global existence, if not international law itself, requires the prosecution of those accused of genocidal behavior.” (65) For several decades the international legal community has attempted to bring to fruition a permanent international criminal court. Logic must dictate however, that a permanent institution be developed only if preceding models have enjoyed some significant measure of success. No such evidence exists. Close to a decade later, the ICTR and ICTY have generally failed in their mandate to prosecute the accused and punish the guilty.

In 1946, the General Assembly of the UN recognized that the denial of the right to existence of entire human groups “shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.” (66) Today, genocide is recognized as the ultimate violation of international criminal law. As such, enforcement of the Genocide Convention should be shouldered by all nation-states. In lieu of a permanent ICC, states must step forward and provide national prosecutions for those offenses deemed particularly atrocious to mankind.

TABLE 1

Detainees at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

Name of Detainee Former Official Function

Akayesu, Jean-Paul Bourgmestre of Taba

Bagambiki, Emmanuel Prefect of Cyangugu

Bagilishema, Ignace Bourgmestre of Mabanza

Bagosoro, Thenoeste Minister of Defense

Barayagwiza, Jean Bosco Director of Political Affairs

Bicamumpaka, Jerome Minister of Foreign Affairs

Bikindi, Simon Musician

Bizimungu, Casimir Minister of Health

Gacumbitsi, Sylvestre Bourgmestre of Rurumo Commune

Imanishimwe, Samuel Lieutenant

Kabiligi, Gratien Brigadier General

Kajelijeli, Juvenal Bourgmestre of Mukingo

Kambanda, Jean Prime Minister

Kamuhanda, Jean Minister of Culture and Education

Kanyabashi, Joseph Bourgmestre of Ngoma

Karemera, Edouard Minister of Interior

Kayishema, Clement Prefect of Kibuye

Migenzi, Justin Minister of Commerce

Mpambara, Jean Bourgmestre of Rukara

Mugiraneza, Prosper Minister of Civil Service

Muhimana, Mikaeli Councillor of Gishyita

Musabyimana, Samuel Bishop of Shyogwe

Musema, Alfred Director of Tea Factory

Muvunyi, Tharcisse Commander of Ecole Sous-Officiers

Nahimana, Ferdinand Director of RTLM

Ndayambaje, Elie Bourgmestre of Muganza

Ndindabahizi, Emmanuel Minister of Finance

Ndindiliyimana, Augustin Chief of Staff of Gendarmerie Nationale

Ngeze, Hassan Chief Editor, Kangura Newspaper

Ngirumpatse, Mathieu Director General

Niyitegeka, Eliezer Minister of Information

Nsabimana, Sylvain Prefect of Butare

Nsengiyumva, Anatole Lieutenant Colonel

Nshamihigo, Simeon Deputy Prosecutor

Ntabakuze, Aloys Commander of Battalion

Ntagerura, Andre Minister of Transport

Ntahobali, Arsene Shalom Student

Ntakirutimana, Elizaphan Pastor

Ntakirutimana, Gerard Medical Doctor

Nteziryayo, Alphonse Commanding officer of the Military

Nyiramasuhuko, Pauline Minister of Family & Women Affairs

Nzirorera, Joseph President of National Assembly

Nzuwonemeye, Francois Commander of the 42nd Battalion

Ritaganda, Georges Businessman

Ruggiu, Georges Journalist

Rukundu, Emmanuel Military Captain

Ruzindana, Obed Businessman

Rwamakuba, Andre Minister of Education

Sagahutu, Innocent 2nd in Command of Renaissance Battalion

Semanza, Laurent Bourgmestre of Bicumbi

Serushago, Omar Businessman

Zigiranyirazo, Protais Businessman

Name of Detainee Date of Arrest Date Trial Began

Akayesu, Jean-Paul 10/10/1995 09/01/1997

Bagambiki, Emmanuel 06/05/1998 09/18/2000

Bagilishema, Ignace 02/20/1999 10/28/1999

Bagosoro, Thenoeste 03/09/1996 Not determined

Barayagwiza, Jean Bosco 03/27/1996 10/23/2000

Bicamumpaka, Jerome 04/06/1999 Not determined

Bikindi, Simon 07/12/2001 Not determined

Bizimungu, Casimir 02/11/1999 Not determined

Gacumbitsi, Sylvestre 06/20/2001 Not determined

Imanishimwe, Samuel 08/11/1997 09/18/2000

Kabiligi, Gratien 07/18/1997 Not determined

Kajelijeli, Juvenal 06/05/1998 03/13/2001

Kambanda, Jean 01/18/1997 Pled guilty

Kamuhanda, Jean 11/26/1999 4/17/2001

Kanyabashi, Joseph 06/28/1995 06/12/2001

Karemera, Edouard 06/05/1998 Not determined

Kayishema, Clement 05/02/1996 04/09/1997

Migenzi, Justin 04/06/1999 Not determined

Mpambara, Jean 06/21/2001 Not determined

Mugiraneza, Prosper 04/06/1999 Not determined

Muhimana, Mikaeli 11/08/1999 Not determined

Musabyimana, Samuel 04/26/2001 Not determined

Musema, Alfred 02/11/1995 02/25/1999

Muvunyi, Tharcisse 02/05/2000 Not determined

Nahimana, Ferdinand 03/27/1996 10/23/2000

Ndayambaje, Elie 06/28/1995 06/12/2001

Ndindabahizi, Emmanuel 07/12/2001 Not determined

Ndindiliyimana, Augustin 04/22/2000 Not determined

Ngeze, Hassan 07/18/1997 10/23/2000

Ngirumpatse, Mathieu 06/11/1998 Not determined

Niyitegeka, Eliezer 02/09/1999 Not determined

Nsabimana, Sylvain 07/18/1997 06/12/2001

Nsengiyumva, Anatole 03/27/1996 Not determined

Nshamihigo, Simeon 05/19/2001 Not determined

Ntabakuze, Aloys 07/18/1997 Not determined

Ntagerura, Andre 03/27/1996 09/18/2000

Ntahobali, Arsene Shalom 07/24/1997 06/12/2001

Ntakirutimana, Elizaphan 09/29/1996 09/18/2001

Ntakirutimana, Gerard 10/29/1996 09/18/2001

Nteziryayo, Alphonse 07/18/1997 06/12/2001

Nyiramasuhuko, Pauline 07/18/1997 06/12/2001

Nzirorera, Joseph 06/05/1998 Not determined

Nzuwonemeye, Francois 02/15/2000 Not determined

Ritaganda, Georges 10/10/1995 03/18/1997

Ruggiu, Georges 07/23/1997 Pled guilty

Rukundu, Emmanuel 07/12/2001 Not determined

Ruzindana, Obed 09/20/1996 04/09/1997

Rwamakuba, Andre 10/21/1998 Not determined

Sagahutu, Innocent 02/15/2000 Not determined

Semanza, Laurent 03/27/1996 10/16/2000

Serushago, Omar 06/09/1998 12/14/1998

Zigiranyirazo, Protais 07/26/2001 Not determined

Name of Detainee Status

Akayesu, Jean-Paul Life imprisonment

Bagambiki, Emmanuel Trial in progress

Bagilishema, Ignace Acquitted

Bagosoro, Thenoeste —

Barayagwiza, Jean Bosco Trial in progress

Bicamumpaka, Jerome —

Bikindi, Simon —

Bizimungu, Casimir —

Gacumbitsi, Sylvestre —

Imanishimwe, Samuel Trial in progress

Kabiligi, Gratien —

Kajelijeli, Juvenal Trial in progress

Kambanda, Jean Life imprisonment

Kamuhanda, Jean Trial in progress

Kanyabashi, Joseph Trial in progress

Karemera, Edouard —

Kayishema, Clement Life imprisonment

Migenzi, Justin —

Mpambara, Jean —

Mugiraneza, Prosper —

Muhimana, Mikaeli —

Musabyimana, Samuel —

Musema, Alfred Life imprisonment

Muvunyi, Tharcisse —

Nahimana, Ferdinand Trial in progress

Ndayambaje, Elie Trial in progress

Ndindabahizi, Emmanuel —

Ndindiliyimana, Augustin —

Ngeze, Hassan Trial in progress

Ngirumpatse, Mathieu —

Niyitegeka, Eliezer —

Nsabimana, Sylvain Trial in progress

Nsengiyumva, Anatole —

Nshamihigo, Simeon —

Ntabakuze, Aloys —

Ntagerura, Andre Trial in progress

Ntahobali, Arsene Shalom Trial in progress

Ntakirutimana, Elizaphan Trial in progress

Ntakirutimana, Gerard Trial in progress

Nteziryayo, Alphonse Trial in progress

Nyiramasuhuko, Pauline Trial in progress

Nzirorera, Joseph —

Nzuwonemeye, Francois —

Ritaganda, Georges Life imprisonment

Ruggiu, Georges 12 years in prison

Rukundu, Emmanuel —

Ruzindana, Obed 25 years in prison

Rwamakuba, Andre —

Sagahutu, Innocent —

Semanza, Laurent Trial in progress

Serushago, Omar 15 years in prison

Zigiranyirazo, Protais —

TABLE 2

Detainees at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Names

Convicted (21) Radislav Kristic, Dario Kordic, Mario

Cerkez, Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir

Kovac, Zoran Vukovic, Tihomir Blaskic,

Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic,

Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic,

Vladimir Santic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim

Delic, Esad Landzo, Stevan Todorovic,

Goran Jelisic, Anto Furundzija, Zlatko

Aleksovski, Dusko Tadic, Drazen Erdemovic

Acquitted (2) Zejnil Delalic, Dragan Papic

Charges Withdrawn (6) Marinko Katava, Ivan Santic, Pero

Skopljak, Slavko Dokmanovic, Milan

Kovacevic, Dorde Dukic

Awaiting trial (31) Miroslav Kvocka, Mlado Radic, Zoran

Zigic, Milojica Kos, Milorad Krnojelac,

Dragan Kolundzija, Radoslav Brdanin,

Vinko Martinovic, Momir Talic, Damir

Dosen, Stanislav Galic, Mitar Vasiljevic,

Dragoljub Prcac, Mladen Naletilic,

Momcilo Krajisnik, Dragan Nikolic, Dusko

Sikirica, Blagoje Simic, Milomir Stakic,

Dragan Obrenovic, Slobodan Milosevic,

Rahim Ademi, Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed

Alagic, Amir Kubura, Vidoje Blagojevic,

Milan Simic, Dragan Jokic, Simo Zaric,

Miroslav Tadic, Sefer Halilovic

Outstanding Warrants (27) Zeljko Meakic, Momcilo Gruban, Dusan

Knezevic, Goran Borovnica, Dragan Fustar,

Nenad Banovic, Predrag Banovic, Ranko

Cesic, Milan Martic, Radovan Karadzic,

Ratko Mladic, Ivica Rajic, Mile Mrksic,

Miroslav Radic, VeselinSljivancanin,

Zoran Marinic, Gojko Jankovic, Dragan

Zelenovic, Radovan Stankovic, Milan

Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub

Ojdanic, Vlajko Stojilkovic, Milan Lukic,

Sredoje Lukic, Stojan Zupljanin, Ante

Gotovina

TABLE 3

Total Expenditures for the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda

(ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), by Year, in Millions of

Dollars

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

ICTR — — 17 40 42

ICTY .276 11 25 35 49

1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

ICTR 57 75 86 93 410

ICTY 65 94 96 96 471.276

NOTES

(1.) Vahakn Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide (Providence, RI: Berghan Books, 1995).

(2.) Jonathan Guttmann, The Beginning of Genocide (New York, NY: Armenian Historical Research Association, 1965).

(3.) See Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide, 219.

(4.) George S. Yacoubian, Jr., “Underestimating the Magnitude of International Crime: Implications of Genocidal Behavior for the Discipline of Criminology,” World Bulletin 14, no. 3-4, (1998): 23-36.

(5.) Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 1944.

(6.) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN GAOR Res., 260A (III) 9 December 1948.

(7.) George S. Yacoubian, Jr., “Countdown to a Permanent International Criminal Court: Toward a Rapprochement of the Cambodian Genocide,” Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict 1, no. 4, (1999): 4-13.

(8.) Jean-Paul Sartre, On Genocide (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1968).

(9.) Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1981).

(10.) Leo Kuper, The Pity of It All: Polarisation of Racial and Ethnic Relations (London: Duckworth, 1977).

(11.) Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses,” in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, G.J. Andreopoulos, ed. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).

(12.) M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia,” in The Prosecution of International Crimes, R. Clark and M. Sann, eds. (Camden, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996).

(13.) Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1995)

(14.) Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide, 14.

(15.) Ibid.

(16.) Ibid., note 13, at 58.

(17.) S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/935, 1994.

(18.) United Nations, Security Council, letter dated 1 October 11994, from the secretary-general, addressed to the president of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1004/1125 at 148 (1994).

(19.) Ibid. at 150.

(20.) S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Session, 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1168, 1994.

(21.) M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law (Vol. III), (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999).

(22.) The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established pursuant to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.

(23.) International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, 19 January 1946.

(24.) S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Session, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1992).

(25.) Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (New York, NY: Aspen Law & Business, 1992).

(26.) Arnold Brackman, The Other Nurenberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (New York, NY: Morrow, William & Company, 1987).

(27.) Payam Akhavan, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment,” American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 501-10.

(28.) Ibid.

(29.) Y. Blum, “U.N. Membership of the “New” Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break,” American Journal Of International Law 86 (1992): 830-38.

(30.) Ibid.

(31.) Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. GOAR, 47th Session, Item 97, U.N. Doc A/47/666 (1992).

(32.) Ibid.

(33.) Ibid.

(34.) M. O’Connell, “Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War,” Indiana Law Journal 67 (1992): 903-35.

(35.) Ibid.

(36.) See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/713, 1991.

(37.) See S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR, 3023rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/724, 1991.

(38.) See S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, 3075th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/752, 1992.

(39.) See S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 3008 3rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/757, 1992.

(40.) Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Res. 808, U.N. SCOR. At 5, U.D. Doc. S/25704, 1992.

(41.) Ibid. at 4.

(42.) Paul Bekker, “The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia,” American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 639-68.

(43.) Eight convictions and one acquittal.

(44.) Twenty-one convictions and two acquittals.

(45.) Michael P. Scharf, “The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal,” DePaul Law Review 49 (2000): 925-55.

(46.) Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United States (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company, 1999).

(47.) M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Establishing an International Criminal Court: Historical Survey,” Military Law Review 149 (1995): 49-57.

(48.) Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “Developments in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 93 (1999): 22-29.

(49.) Ibid.

(50.) Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 35.

(51.) David O. Friedrichs, “The Crime of the Century? The Case for the Holocaust,” Crime, Law and Social Change 34, no. 1, (2000): 21-41.

(52.) L. Edward Day and Margaret Vandiver, “Criminology and Genocide studies: Notes on What Might Have Been and What Still Could Be,” Crime, Law and Social Change 34, no. 1, (2000): 43-59.

(53.) William S. Laufer, The Forgotten Criminology of Genocide, in The Criminology of Criminal Law, W. S. Laufer and F. Adler, eds. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999).

(54.) Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe; George S. Yacoubian, Jr., “Sanctioning Alternatives in International Criminal Law: Recommendations for the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia,” World Affairs 161, no. 1, (1998): 48-54; George S. Yacoubian, Jr., “Underestimating the Magnitude of International Crime: Implications of Genocidal Behavior for the Discipline of Criminology,” Injustice Studies 1, no. 1, (1998), .

(55.) Alex Alvarez, “Adjusting to Genocide,” Social Science History 21 (1997): 139-76.

(56.) Frank Hagan, Political Crime: Ideology and Criminology (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1997).

(57.) David O. Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995).

(58.) Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, 141.

(58.) George S. Yacoubian, Jr., “The (In)significance of Genocidal Behavior to the Discipline of Criminology,” Crime, Law and Social Change 34, no. 1 (2000): 7-19.

(60.) Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia.

(61.) Ronald Akers, Criminological Theories (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 1998).

(62.) George S. Yacoubian, Jr., “The Efficacy of International Criminal Justice: Evaluating the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide,” World Affairs 161, no. 4 (1999): 186-92.

(63.) See Laufer, The Forgotten Criminology of Genocide

(64.) Ibid.

(65.) G.A. Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1. at 188 (1946), 191.

(66.) Ibid.

George Yacoubian is director of research at McFarland and Associates, Inc., Silver Spring, Maryland.

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