Soviet foreign minister visits Washington – Eduard Shevardnadze – President Reagan’s and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s remarks before signing agreement on the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, includes Sec

Soviet foreign minister visits Washington – Eduard Shevardnadze – President Reagan’s and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s remarks before signing agreement on the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, includes Secretary Shultz’s news conference – transcript

Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was in Washington September 15-18, 1987, to meet with President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and other government officials.

Following are the President’s and Foreign Minister’s remarks before Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed the agreement on the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers; the texts of that agreement and two protocols; a White House fact sheet on the agreement; a news conference by the Secretary; two joint statements; and a statement by the President.

REMARKS, SEPT. 15, 1987(1)

President Reagan

I am very pleased; today the United States and the Soviet Union will sign the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. This agreement is another practical step in our efforts to reduce the risks of conflict that could otherwise result from accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding. Today’s agreement goes beyond existing structures to establish the first new, direct channel for communications between Washington and Moscow since the creation of the “Hot Line’ in 1963.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers will play an important role in further lessening the chances of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. They provide a means to transmit notifications required under existing confidence-building measures and could play a key role in exchanging the information necessary for effective verification of future arms control agreements.

For the United States, this agreement results from close cooperation among the executive, Congress, and private groups and individuals to produce a pragmatic agreement that advances our common goals of peace and security. I would like to make special mention of the excellent counsel and leadership that we have received over several years on nuclear risk reduction from Senators John Warner and Sam Nunn. I would also like to express my appreciation to the U.S. delegation on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers–and especially its cochairman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and my Special Assistant Robert Linhard–and to the Soviet delegation, headed by Ambassador Aleksei Obukhov, for their skill and dedication in successfully concluding the negotiations.

This agreement complements our ongoing and promising efforts in Geneva to achieve–for the first time–deep, equitable, and effectively verifiable reductions in Soviet and American nuclear arsenals.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I am pleased to have you sign this agreement today and look forward to the day when General Secretary Gorbachev and I can sign even more historic agreements in our common search for peace.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, comrades, in Soviet-American relations in recent times, events like this one are not too frequent. However, 1987 turns out to be relatively fruitful. In April– last April–during the visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow, we signed an agreement on peaceful cooperation in space. Today we are signing an agreement on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

The signing by us today of this agreement marks a tangible step in the practical implementation of the understanding which Mikhail Gorbachev and you, Mr. President, reached in Geneva. Nuclear war should never be fought, you both said. Let us hope that the agreement that we are signing today will help to move further toward that historic goal.

This is a sign which may be a prelude to more important agreements, in particular, agreements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, as the General Secretary of the CPSU, (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Central Committee and the President of the United States agreed in Reykjavik. The most important thing is to do the utmost for this to happen to the gratification of our peoples and of the entire world community.

The sooner it happens, the better. Then, having done good work for our time, we will be able to hope that time, too, will work for us. Today we have acted to try to ease somewhat the pressing burden of fears, uncertainties, and anxieties of which people have become tired. I would like to use this opportunity to cordially thank all those who, for 2 years, worked with perseverance and dedication to prepare this agreement.

I would like to pay tribute to the diplomats and experts and to the members of the U.S. Senate, particularly to Senators Nunn and Warner, who worked with a great deal of energy and persistence to promote this idea. I would like to hope that this small gulp of hope is a prelude to the quenching of the global thirst for peace and security. Thank you.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT, SEPT. 15, 1987

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on September 30, 1971, and the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Each party shall establish, in its capital, a national Nuclear Risk Reduction Center that shall operate on behalf of and under the control of its respective Government.

Article 2

The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to transmit notifications identified in Protocol I which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement.

In the future, the list of notifications transmitted through the Centers may be altered by agreement between the Parties, as relevant new agreements are reached.

Article 3

The Parties shall establish a special facsimile communications link between their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in accordance with Protocol II which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 4

The Parties shall staff their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers as they deem appropriate, so as to ensure their normal functioning.

Article 5

The Parties shall hold regular meetings between representatives of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers at least once each year to consider matters related to the functioning of such Centers.

Article 6

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

Article 7

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

Done at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For The United States of America

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

For The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics

SHEVARDNADZE

PROTOCOL I TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the Parties have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties shall transmit the following types of notifications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers:

(a) notifications of ballistic missile launches under Article 4 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear Was between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971;

(b) notifications of ballistic missile launches under paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972.

Article 2

The scope and format of the information to be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers shall be agreed upon.

Article 3

Each Party also may, at its own discretion as a display of good will and with a view to building confidence, transmit through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers communications other than those provided for under Article 1 of this Protocol.

Article 4

Unless the Parties agree otherwise, all communications transmitted through and communications procedures of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers’ communication link will be confidential.

Article 5

This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, remains in force.

Done at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SHEVARDNADZE

PROTOCOL II TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the Parties have agreed as follows:

Article 1

To establish and maintain for the purpose of providing direct facsimile communications between their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established in accordance with Article 1 of this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the national Centers, an INTELSAT satellite circuit and a STATSIONAR satellite circuit, each with a secure orderwire communications capability for operational monitoring. In this regard:

(a) There shall be terminals equipped for communication between the national Centers:

(b) Each Party shall provide communications circuits capable of simultaneously transmitting and receiving 4800 bits per second;

(c) Communication shall begin with test operation of the INTELSAT satellite circuit, as soon as purchase, delivery, and installation of the necessary equipment by the Parties are completed. Thereafter, taking into account the results of test operations, the Parties shall agree on the transition to a fully operational status;

(d) To the extent practicable, test operation of the STATSIONAR satellite circuit shall begin simultaneously with test operation of the INTELSAT satellite circuit. Taking into account the results of test operations, the Parties shall agree on the transition to a fully operational status.

Article 2

To employ agreed-upon information security devices to assure secure transmission of facsimile messages. In this regard:

(a) The information security devices shall consist of microprocessors that will combine the digital message output with buffered random data read from standard 5-1/4 inch floppy disks;

(b) Each Party shall provide, through its Embassy, necessary keying material to the other.

Article 3

To establish and maintain at each operating end of the two circuits, facsimile terminals of the same make and model. In this regard:

(a) Each Party shall be responsible for the purchase, installation, operation, and maintenance of its own terminals, the related information security devices, and local transmission circuits appropriate to the implementation of the Protocol;

(b) A Group III facsimile unit which meets CCITT Recommendations T.4 and T.30 and operates at 4800 bits per second shall be used;

(c) Direct facsimile messages from the USSR national Center to the U.S. national Center shall be transmitted and received in the Russian language, and from the U.S. national Center to the USSR national Center in the English language;

(d) Transmission and operating procedures shall be in conformity with procedures employed on the Direct Communications Link and adapted as necessary for the purpose of communications between the national Centers.

Article 4

To establish and maintain a secure orderwire communications capability necessary to coordinate facsimile operation. In this regard:

(a) The orderwire terminals used with the information security devices described in paragraph (a) of Article 2 shall incorporate standard USSR Cyrillic and United States Latin keyboards and cathode ray tube displays to permit the exchange of message between operators. The specific layout of the Cyrillic keyboard shall be as specified by the Soviet side;

(b) To coordinate the work of operators, the orderwire shall be configured so as to permit, prior to the transmission and reception of messages, the exchange of all information pertinent to the coordination of such messages;

(c) Orderwire messages concerning transmissions shall be encoded using the same information security devices specified in paragraph (a) of Article 2;

(d) The orderwire shall use the same modem and communications link as used for facsimile message transmission;

(e) A printer shall be included to provide a record copy of all information exchanged on the orderwire.

Article 5

To use the same type of equipment and the same maintenance procedures as currently in use for the Direct Communications Link for the establishment of direct facsimile communications between the national Centers. The equipment, security devices, and space parts necessary for telecommunications links and the orderwire shall be provided by the United States side to the Soviet side in return for payment of costs thereof by the Soviet side.

Article 6

To ensure the exchange of information necessary for the operation and maintenance of the telecommunication system and equipment configuration.

Article 7

To take all possible measures to assure the continuous, secure, and reliable operation of the equipment and communications link, including the orderwire, for which each Party is responsible in accordance with this Protocol.

Article 8

To determine, by mutual agreement between technical experts of the Parties, the distribution and calculation of expenses for putting into operation the communication link, its maintenance and further development.

Article 9

To convene meetings of technical experts of the Parties in order to consider initially questions pertaining to the practical implementation of the activities provided for in this Protocol and, thereafter, by mutual agreement and as necessary for the purpose of improving telecommunications and information technology in order to achieve the mutually agreed functions of the national Centers.

Article 10

This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, remains in force.

Done at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SHEVARDNADZE

SECRETARY’S NEWS CONFERENCE, SEPT. 15, 1987(3)

The President and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have just finished a session in the Cabinet Room and a luncheon discussion. That was preceded by not quite 3 hours of private conversation between Mr. Shevardnadze and me.

These meetings start a period of about 3 days of meetings between us. The general tone of the discussions has been very stragithforward, businesslike, and constructive. We have touched, in one way or another, on most of the issues that are of interest to each side. We have developed the procedures that we’re going to use during these meetings, including the working groups that will explore various subjects. And I think that the meetings are off to a good start.

Q. Can you tell us anything about the letter from Mr. Gorbachev to the President and any specificity about a summit?

A. We have just received the letter so we are reading it and studying it. I think it is not for us to reveal the contents beyond saying that it is a good, informative letter, and we’re glad to have it.

Insofar as the question of a summit meeting is concerned, I think both sides feel pretty much the same way; that a summit should have connected with it some significant results and that we should work hard to prepare it carefully. That is what we’re doing, and that is what we’re working for. But the emphasis in these meetings is not on a summit. We haven’t discussed the subject particularly or talked about dates or anything of that kind.

What we are doing is talking about the substance of the issues that we’re both interested in, and we’ll see where we go from there.

Q. Given the fact that you’re talking substance, as you’ve said yesterday and today, is it likely in your view that you will be able to make enough substantial progress to hold a summit meeting with the Soviets this year?

A. I can’t tell you that because we are in the midst of these discussions, and I think there should be some things that are agreed on. I know you’re tired of hearing me say it, but you don’t have an agreement until you have an agreement. We have some important issues to discuss, and we have set them out. We will clarify them probably this afternoon, and we have a good set of arrangements for this discussion.

We had a private meeting this morning. We’ll have plenary sessions. We have very competent people that they have brought and that we have here–all of our top people to dig into these things–and we have some informal social-type gatherings where we can talk. So I think we are well set up to really dig in.

Q. What’s the outlook? Is the outlook good, then?

A. I’m not one for commenting on that. I think it’s just a question of the fact that there are important issues, and we’re going to work on them. And if we resolve them, we’ll let you know.

Q. The words you chose, “straightforward and businesslike,’ are often words that diplomats use to indicate some sort of friction.

A. No, quite to the contrary. I think the ability that I have and the President has to talk with Mr. Shevardnadze in a very good way, and he similarly, means that we’re going to be able to identify quite candidly what our problems are and dig into them. And personally I think, at least as I would see them, they’re soluble, but that remains to be seen.

Q. Are the Soviets putting last-minute obstacles in the way of the intermediate–

A. We have seen some things come up that surprised us that they were brought up. On the other hand, they are being dealt with, and we will just have to see.

Q. Are you speaking of arms in terms of things brought up that you didn’t expect? And what were the issues that were discussed today–basically topical?

A. In the field of arms control, as everyone is well aware, the very important area where we have nailed down most of the main points–all of the really main points–is in the intermediate-range area. There has also been a lot of progress made in strategic arms. Less so in the space area.

We see other areas where there are possibilities. In my own judgment, I think the subject of nuclear testing is one where progress might be made and perhaps others. The Soviets have made some moves in the area of chemical warfare lately that are promising.

From our standpoint, however– and they have been very much in agreement with this–we don’t regard these discussions as arms control discussions. They are discussions about the broad range of issues that we work on together. So we had some very interesting discussion on the subject of human rights this morning, and we will have a working group set out to discuss that further. We will talk about bilateral problems of which there are quite a few, and also opportunities. And we will discuss regional issues. So we expect to discuss the full range of things that are important to us.

Q. Have the Soviets come up, either in the letter from Mr. Gorbachev or in the statement you’ve heard from Mr. Shevardnadze today–have they come up with any new ideas, new proposals that would seem to you might be able to bridge the gap on some of the key remaining differences?

A. We’ll have to look at the things they have to say. We’re going to have our first sort of formal plenary session this afternoon in about an hour; we have some thoughts and apparently they do, and we’ll just have to see where we go. I don’t want to try to characterize things as being new or not.

Q. Did you mention human rights as being interesting? Have you any indication that the Soviets are prepared to reconsider, or at least review, the procedures, or the lack of procedures, they have for emigration?

A. We’ve had some discussion when we had a delegation in Moscow about 2 or 3 weeks ago in which both sides discussed the desirability of more systematic ways of examining the various issues involved that we have under the general label of “human rights.’ We made some progress there. Mr. Shevardnadze and I discussed that some more this morning, and I think that it’s possible that we will make some progress that both sides will think is in their interests. So I’m rather encouraged by that.

Q. Are the surprises that you referred to a few moments ago in the field of arms control?

A. Did I say “surprises?’

Q. Yes, you did. Yes, sir.

A. I did?

Q. But I don’t know if you meant at this meeting or you meant in the weeks leading up to the meeting.

Q. Were they surprises pertaining to this morning?

A. You were talking about things that were brought up in connection with the last-minute obstacles, yes.

Q. You don’t mean here. Don’t you mean on the table in Geneva?

A. No. I mean before here. That’s right. Somebody asked me that, and I said yes. There have been some things brought up that we felt fall outside the INF area–the most prominent, of course, is the German Pershing IA missiles. That will not be a part of the INF negotiations. On the other hand, as we see it, Chancellor Kohl has made a very forthcoming statement on that subject.

Q. Do you see the question of the Pershings, the P-IAs, as being a genuine obstacle to the Soviets agreeing with us on an INF treaty?

A. It shouldn’t be. In the first place, cooperative systems with other countries or third-country systems are not a part of our negotiations involving just U.S. and Soviet systems, so they are not part of the INF agreement.

Now to the extent that the Soviets have a problem, as they have stated, Chancellor Kohl’s statement is directly responsive to it. So I think that somehow it ought to be possible to work through that.

Q. Do you think the Soviets will accept that view ultimately?

A. I don’t speak for them, and I’m not going to try. It’s a problem, we are working on it, and I think that it’s just about as we described it.

Q. I’m a Polish correspondent. Do you think that this agreement which was signed today may improve the relations between the United States and Eastern European countries, like Poland, for instance?

A. I hadn’t thought about it that way, but I think there’s a–certainly, you can argue that. It is a definite agreement on something of importance, broadly speaking, involving something of great interest to East and West. So everybody ought to get a little boost out of it, and I hope that there is some spillover effect.

Q. Do you believe that Mr. Shevardnadze is empowered to conclude the major remaining unresolved issues while he’s here, or do you think he’s going to have to go home first and check with the Politburo?

A. I have the impression that he has come here well prepared, and he has certainly brought with him an impressive group of Soviet experts on subjects that are of interest to us. So I don’t know the answer to your question, but I can only respond that way.

Q. Can you say whether or not you have heard anything different in your 3-hour discussion this morning than what has been the Soviets’ publicly stated positions with regard to the P-IAs, the nuclear warheads, and so forth?

A. In this morning’s discussion–I have summarized it, and we didn’t try to this morning get into the particulars of any of the issues. I suppose if I took the morning’s session in proportionate terms, we spent about as much time as any in discussing our views about human rights matters and working toward the working group and how it would proceed. But we didn’t try to delve into the details, so there wasn’t really an opportunity to see to what extent they may have a somewhat different approach.

Q. Are the Pershing warheads the principal obstacle to an agreement? You say they shouldn’t be, but are they right now?

A. As I say, they shouldn’t be, and we think that Chancellor Kohl’s statement has been quite a forthcoming one. It is a subject that the Soviets have raised, and so we’ll have to understand what it is that truly bothers them and try to put that to rest.

Q. But that is the obstacle–

A. I don’t know. There are probably others.

Q. What about the issue of the destruction of warheads?

Q. What about destroying American warheads? Did you get any explanation of what they meant by that?

A. No. As I said, we didn’t get to that level of detail, but let me just once again say this. In the proposals they have tabled in Geneva on what is to be done when some nuclear-tipped missile is to be taken out of action, it is very clear that they have no interest at all in doing anything but taking back to their own territory the nuclear material that is part of the system. That is our view as well. It has always been the case that the nuclear material has been kept in the United States or U.S.S.R. so there is no issue there.

Now, exactly what people may mean by a “warhead’–whether they mean the shell after you take out components or exactly what–remains to be seen. But as far as the actual nuclear explosive is concerned, that is material that each side keeps for itself and the configuration of exactly how that is put together as an explosive device is a very well kept and closely kept secret and will stay that way.

Q. Do the Soviets agree to that?

A. I’ve just described to you the proposal that they put on the table in Geneva, so obviously they agree to that.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS, SEPT. 17, 1987

The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations, the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process.

This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the U.S.-U.S.S.R. treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other’s test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

JOINT STATEMENT ON DIPLOMATIC TALKS, SEPT. 18, 1987(1)

Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have completed 3 days of thorough and useful discussions on all aspects of the relationship between the two countries.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reviewed the full spectrum of questions regarding nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons arms control. In particular, the two ministers, together with their advisers, conducted intensive negotiations on the question of intermediate-range and shorter range missiles. This resulted in agreement in principle to conclude a treaty. The Geneva delegations of both sides have been instructed to work intensively to resolve remaining technical issues and promptly to complete a draft treaty text. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that a similarly intensive effort should be made to achieve a treaty on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks.

Having discussed questions related to nuclear testing, the two sides agreed to begin, before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. They approved a separate statement on this subject.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister also discussed regional issues.

The two sides discussed a broad range of issues concerning bilateral relations. A work program was agreed, to be implemented in 1987-88, designed to intensify joint efforts in various areas of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

A constructive discussion of human rights issues and humanitarian questions took place.

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed that an additional meeting is needed to review the results of the work in all of these areas, including the efforts of the delegations in the Geneva nuclear and space talks. They agreed that this meeting would take place in Moscow in the second half of October.

In order to sign a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter range missiles and to cover the full range of issues in the relationship between the two countries, a summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will take place. The summit will be held in the fall of 1987, with exact dates to be determined during the talks between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister in Moscow in October.

PRESIDENT’S STATEMENT, SEPT. 18, 1987(1)

Secretary Shultz has reported to me on the results of his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. As you know, the talks covered arms reduction, regional conflicts, human rights, and bilateral issues. Although we have serious differences in many areas, the tone of the talks was frank, constructive, and notable progress was made.

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have issued a joint statement, which I believe you all have now. And I’m pleased to note that agreement in principles was reached to conclude an INF treaty. They’ll meet again in Moscow next month to continue their efforts and to work out the details of a summit between me and General Secretary Gorbachev later this fall.

I want to congratulate Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and their delegations for their outstanding efforts over the past 3 days.

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 21, 1987.

2 Text from White House press release.

3 Held at the White House (press release 184 of Sept. 16).

Photo: President Reagan meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other members of the Soviet delegation in the Cabinet Room of the White House on September 15, 1987. Seated across from the President are (left to right) Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States; Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; Viktor Karpov, Soviet Ambassador at Large; and Gennadi Gerasimov, Soviet spokesman. On the President’s side of the table are (left to right) Kenneth Adelman, ACDA Director; Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Rozanne Ridgeway, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs; Secretary Shultz; the President; and Vice President Bush.

Photo: Secretary Shultz joins the President in the Residence for his meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on Sept. 17, 1987.

COPYRIGHT 1987 U.S. Government Printing Office

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