How globalization influences Russian military-technological policy

How globalization influences Russian military-technological policy

Maj. S.A. Popov

For several years, Russian and foreign economists have been engaged in a comprehensive study of globalization, a process that has engulfed the world economy. Military specialists have been analyzing it as well. Specifically, its essence and influence on the military policies were considered in detail in a recently published article by A.F. Klimenko. (1) The present publication will attempt as far as possible to enlarge on certain points contained in the said article and to dwell in more detail on the military-economic aspects of this problem.

The Essence of Globalization

Those familiar with the history of the economic thought may state with certainty that in itself the idea of globalization is not new. This comparatively new term hides the well-known theory about it being possible to increase the efficiency of economic entities on the basis of international division of labor (international specialization).

In fact, the entire history of mankind bears witness to the fact that the public division of labor leads to enhanced labor productiveness. Proponents of the overwhelming majority of economic schools and movements (with the exception, perhaps, of Aristotle alone) agreed that the commodity form of economic activities, one based on the specialized production, is considerably more effective than the subsistence form.

But the idea about it being possible to increase popular prosperity through an international division of labor was first formulated only in the late 18th century by David Ricardo (1772-1823), member of the classical political economy school. He believed that governments of all nations should in no way restrict foreign trade, seeing that as one of the most important conditions enabling this model to function. In that epoch, the English made an active use of this theory for expanding their markets. Owners of the most advanced contemporary technologies, they could easily overpower their foreign rivals and make their country the economic leader for years to come, should European continental states renounce support for their home producers. Indicatively, the English Government practiced mercantilism in respect of the home market, imposing administrative restrictions on foreign commodity traffic, encouraging export of finished products, stimulating intermediate trade, and attracting money from abroad. The European states, however, paid the English in kind, a case in point being the Continental System Emperor Napoleon I organized in order to bar off British-made goods.

Double standards are in use in the international division of labor to this day. At the turn of the 1960s, the global theory came in handy again, this time as a tool in the hands of the U.S. administration.

Within the framework of an information campaign waged in support of globalization, the Americans announced the creation of a new world order, in which nations might unite for the common goal, so as to implement mankind’s shared wish for peace and security, freedom and legality. That was how George Bush, Sr. set forth, in 1991, the concept, which the U.S. specialists had formulated in the 1970s. But its practical implementation proved a far cry from what had been declared.

As shown by investigations, (2) the new division of labor consists in the U.S., U.K., Germany, France and Japan concentrating on R & D and manufacture of hi-tech products and services that yield the most in terms of value added. Another two or three dozen states will be involved in technological chains as suppliers of components and performers of some other production functions. Other countries are cast in the role of suppliers of raw materials (whose production brings almost no value added) and markets for goods produced in the leader nations.

The true motives for the international integration are clearly evident from A National Security for a New Century, a paper the U.S. administration published in 1998. (3) The document says that America’s economic prosperity is heavily dependent on foreign trade operations, primarily the exports. In a world, where 95% of consumers live outside the United States, we must expand our foreign trade in order to secure economic growth inside this country, says the paper. Moreover, in the current decade, the growth rates of the world economy will be three times as fast as those of the U.S. economy, adds the paper. This tendency will only enhance the dependence of the national prosperity on the outside markets.

The strategy says directly that in order to expand export capabilities the administration continues bringing pressure to bear on its trade partners in multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements. But the ultimate aim of its foreign economic policy is creating a U.S.-dominated international trade system. We will put ourselves in the center of the system determining the trade relationships, says the document.

Importantly, the new White House administration abides by the same principles, as is clear from A National Security Strategy for a Global Age drawn up in 2000, (4) which reiterates many key points that appeared in its predecessor.

To be sure, this sort of international specialization results in a steadily growing income gap between the richest (in per capita GDP) and the poorest nations.

If, as calculated by the World Bank, the 1960 ratio of popular earnings in high-income to low-income countries was 30:1, it doubled by 1990, and grew to 74: 1 in 1997 (Table 1). (5)

Consequently, the foreign trade liberalization the U.S. actively promotes within the framework of the global idea assists further development of the international division of labor that benefits the world leaders. Importantly, the Americans, like Britain two centuries back, are seeking in every way to restrict foreign producers’ access to the home market. Some cases in point are a ban on Mexican motor haulage in the U.S. territory, antidumping proceedings against foreign steel producers, huge national fanning subsidies, and many other extra-tariff barriers. Everything is reproduced practically to a point. The only difference is that the leader enjoys hugely grown information opportunities for thrusting the global idea on the world community. And that already brings results as expressed in an expansion of the economic influence spheres of the most advanced countries.

One should make this reservation: insofar as globalization, in its essence, is primarily an economic phenomenon, it is not quite correct to use the political classification in order to describe it. The thing is, the current “power centers” fad fails to reflect the true geo-economic division. All writers, for example, indicated the united Europe (6) as a power center in its own right, although the economic interests of France, Germany and the U.K. differ in many respects. There were attempts to form one power center out of the two incompatibles, Japan and China, or to drop one of these from consideration altogether. India, South Africa and some other states that make considerable contributions to the international economic situation were always left outside the “power centers.” And the economic potentials of the so-called power centers, too, are incomparable, to say the least (Table 2). (7)

In my view, therefore, while analyzing the geo-economic space and essence of globalization, it seems more proper to single out world leaders and order one and two regional leaders rather than “power centers.” This approach was First suggested a mere two years ago, (8) but it has found its supporters and is used not only by members of governmental authorities but also by research and academic organizations for a study of world economic development trends.

In keeping with this approach, a world leader is only a state which enjoys most influence on two or more regions and is actively involved in the economic life of the majority of other regions. In the late 20th century, these were the United States of America, France, Germany and Japan.

Order one regional leader is a state that has most influence on the economic situation in a concrete region. The leader itself may find itself both in and out of the region. At present, this criterion can be applied to Italy, South Africa, and, with a certain amount of point-stretching, Russia.

Finally, order two regional leader is a state that has an influence on the economic situation in a separate region, but simultaneously it may be under the influence of one of the world leaders. An order two regional leader is always within the region under consideration, Australia and Brazil being the best-known cases in point.

One may also name a number of states whose positions in the geo-economic space are in process of serious change. More specifically, the last 15 years saw a rapid strengthening of China and a steady tendency for the weakening of the U.K.

Interaction between world and regional leaders as well as expansion or otherwise of the boundaries of their economic impact are factors enabling a sufficiently accurate description of the processes afoot in the world economy and a forecast of their development trends. (9)

Amid the variety of connections and interests of different states, we will consider just one aspect of the problem, to wit, how this process has influenced the world weapons production and Russia’s military –technical policy.

Tendencies for Change in Military Production in Global Conditions

The globalization process has brought in its wake some serious changes in the organization of the world military production. The principal ones are the rapid consolidation of WME producers (against the background of reductions in military output amounts) and the wish to recoup losses by building up military equipment supplies to foreign customers. In addition, international specialization has induced, over the last decade, greater intensity in processes of country-to-country cooperation in the course of efforts to develop and create new WME models.

Military production declined considerably after the Cold War. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies statistics, the arms market has shrunk more than 2.5 times over the last 15. years, scaling down from 79 to 29 billion dollars. But the production itself became more structuralized and polarized.

Nations attempted to deal with the problem of reduced demand for military-technical products by increasing export supplies of weapons (Table 3). (10)

As a result, the United States, which already used to dominate the arms market, has considerably improved its positions, with 55% of all weapons being currently produced by U.S. companies. Its closest rival, Britain, controls only 16% of the market. By the late 1990s, American and West European producers accounted for 92% of all WME sales (Table 4). (11)

A similar picture arises from an analysis of actual arms supplies (Table 5). (12) Moreover, as is evident from a comparison of Tables 4 and 5, the existing package of orders for the supply of Russian weapons and military equipment was realized, in recent years, only by 50 percent. As is obvious, the high percentage of unrealized contracts has a negative effect on the image of home producers and is a sign of the low lobbying potential distinguishing this country. It must be stressed that this scenario is fully in conformity with the principles and goals of globalization as described at the start of this article: given the open markets, the most economically and technologically advanced state can easily get the upper hand over its retarded rivals and become the main supplier of most high technology goods to the world market.

An important feature of the world arms trade in that period was selling licenses to produce various types of WME to foreign customers. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that in the 1 980s the U.S. government approved foreign sales of between 200 and 300 military production licenses a year, whereas between 1965 and 1975 the U.S. companies had signed just around 100 such agreements.

West European nations took an active part in the process as well. Over the last 20 years, French companies sold arms production licenses to Spain, U.K., Indonesia, India and Egypt. British firms signed license agreements with Egypt, India, and The Philippines; Germany, with Italy, Brazil, Turkey, India, The Philippines, and Argentina. All of that led to a situation where in the course of implementation of the international license agreements the military-economic ties of NATO countries went beyond the framework of trade in weapons and military equipment and began assuming a qualitatively new global form.

The foreign sales of weapons manufacturing know-how led to the emergence of international consortiums that set up base in many countries of the world. In the late 1990s, a wave of mergers engulfed the arms industries of many nations, the transformations enabling the companies to expand and standardize their product range, to cut the costs considerably by shutting down outfits that produced identical output, and to boost R & D expenditures.

It must be stressed that the capital consolidation took place not only within one country, as, for example, in the case of America’s Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell Aerospace, but also at the international level. It was European and American companies that were primarily involved in the process. As a result of capital merger, a considerable portion of the world military manufacture got concentrated in several dozen major companies located in a limited number of advanced countries. Moreover, if early in the 1990s the share of the five biggest producers in that sector was only 22%, by 1998 it grew almost twofold and exceeded 40%. (13)

In individual countries, the process of unification proved even bigger in scale. There are only four companies controlling practically the entire U.S. military-industrial complex. In China, military aircraft are produced by only two companies.

Another phenomenon, apart from mergers, that became fairly widespread in the late 1990s was cooperation of several WME producers in creating new models of military equipment. The best-known case of interstate cooperation was the joint Eurofighter project involving all foremost European aerospace companies (with the exception of British Aerospace). But it was not by far the only one such instance.

The loss of a number of lucrative contracts (more specifically, the 83-million-dollar contract to develop Rocsat II satellite for Taiwan was overtaken by Germany’s Daimler Chrysler AeroSpace) made the French- and British-controlled Alcatel Space and Matra Marconi Space to join forces, in 1999, on military satellite exports.

Aside from that, Germany and France were jointly developing and producing, in 2000, an attack helicopter; U.K., Germany and France, a futuristic armored vehicle; Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the Viking submarine. In late 2000, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands were engaged in an international cooperation program developing a tracking radar system. Overall for 2000, the European countries implemented 82 joint WME development projects. (14)

There are some cooperation cases on record that go beyond the European Union. More specifically, some joint arms projects were handled by Spain and Brazil, as well as by Israel and a number of European states. Mutually beneficial cooperation that took into account the interests of all participants in a consortium proved possible only in the case of economically advanced states. In the rest of cases, nothing like an equitable partnership took off the ground.

As a result of those changes, the overwhelming majority of nations found themselves in the role of catchers-up and had to let foreign capital come to their arms industries in an attempt to buoy up their national military-industrial potentials. But in practice that led to their greater economic and military-technological dependence on the economic leaders.

How Globalization Influences Russian Military-Technical Policy

Before coming over to the consideration of this topic, one must make this reservation: globalization was not the only and certainly not the most important reason behind the weakening of Russia’s military-economic potential. To a much greater extent it was damaged by the internal, not external, factors, such as the collapse of the USSR that was accompanied by the disintegration of its unified economic mechanism and technological chains. On top of that, the government, which ruled Russia in the 1990s, tended to put the national defense capability problems on the back burner.

At the same time, undertaken in the absence of conscious foreign economic policy or clearly formulated aims, Russia’s integration into the world economic space also had a negative effect on the national military-economic potential.

Most Russian economists firmly believed, since the start of the 1990s, that the disintegration of the USSR activated the process of Russia’s vigorous integration into the world economic community. As is to be regretted, the real state of affairs is not so invariant as it seems to the supporters of globalization. In fact, this country is more actively involved in the international processes. In the first place this concerns changes in the currency legislation and creation of the stock market, one originally oriented mostly to foreign investors. The number of Russian organizations figuring in international economic relations has grown as well.

But there are also a number of sectors, in which Russia is dramatically less active. The case in point is trade in technological products and creation abroad of industrial facilities based on Russian R & D and controlled by Russian specialists. Meanwhile, it is these sectors that determine a country’s status internationally. These shifts could not come to pass imperceptibly for the national economy and consequently for the national military-economic potential. They had the most serious impact on the development of Russia’s military-industrial complex.

Numerous Russian and foreign studies have revealed that international specialization takes place within the framework of individual regions, blocs or alliances, whose members integrate with one of the most influential states. The dramatic shrinking of the Russian economic influence zone in the 1990s led to the loss of many foreign markets and a plunge in the effective demand for Russian output.

The opening of the Russian domestic market and reorientation of domestic consumers to foreign output also caused a contraction of the effective demand for home-produced goods. Combined with a number of other factors, all of that undercut the resource base of Russia’s military-economic potential; As a result, its GDP in 1999 was only 45.8% of what it had been in 1989. Its industrial production declined more than 50% as well (Table 6). (15) In spite of a three-year period of economic growth, this country is yet to restore in full its pre-crisis economic development level.

In terms of military expenditures, Russia found itself at the bottom of the list of ten foremost world states. At present, its share of the world arms spending does not exceed 3%. A particularly worrisome fact is that the biggest cuts were in R & D and WME purchases, the two areas determining the national military potential in the long term. From 1990 to 1997, the share of military R & D and WME purchases within the general actual spending on the organizational development and upkeep of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was reduced from 60% to 19.1%. (16) Although WME production grew (by 5% in 1998 and 37% in 1999), its 1999 volume was only 14-15% of the 1990 figure. Moreover, enterprises in the domestic military defense complex operate on average to no more than 20% of their capacity and those in the ammunition industry, 6.9%. (17) As far as Russian investments in military R & D are concerned, these prove to be two orders of magnitude less than the amounts allocated for the same purposes by the glob al leaders. At present, the problem has been solved to some extent owing to Russian arms exports. Already now a number of companies in the domestic defense industrial complex receive up to 90% of their money from foreign contracts. Given the contraction of external markets, Russia has to sell its products at clearly reduced prices.

The global process hit the federal defense spending from yet another angle as well. As was stated above, the international division of labor is one of the fundamental principles of globalization. But apart from its obvious pluses, the process implies strict specialization of producers, which involves less rivalry between countries. For Russia, which was the main rival to the majority of industrially developed nations, (18) this means being ousted from many hi-tech markets, which, on the one hand, led to a reduced inflow of resources from abroad, and on the other to the curtailment of these productions at home. Since most of these were directly linked with the defense industrial complex, the process substantially complicated the production of many WME types.

The transfer of a portion of operating domestic industrial enterprises to foreign ownership had a negative impact on Russia’s military-economic potential, as did their implementing some programs jointly with the new owners. Low capitalization of the Russian enterprises was a factor enabling even small foreign investors to take over any of them without serious financial inputs.

A perusal of the 1995 intersectoral balance the Russia State Statistical Committee put out in 2000 shows that a greater part of the fixed assets (51.2%) accumulated in the engineering industry in that period had come from abroad. (19) This sort of dependence on foreign technologies has a most negative influence on the state of the defense and industrial complex at home.

The foreign interest in Russian companies failed to blossom into a mutually advantageous cooperation in creating weapons systems. It was not always by far that the foreign owner took steps to retool Russian enterprises or to boost their competitiveness in external markets. New owners shut down (mothballed) some operating enterprises as direct rivals of foreign manufacturers. There are cases on record, when foreign owners and partners, while signing contracts and retooling enterprises, specifically stipulated that the results to be obtained should not be used by the Russian side for military purposes.

Finally, the appearance of foreigners on the boards of directors of Russian enterprises has a negative impact on the state mobilization capabilities. What with their retooling and orientation to foreign standards, the enterprises in question cannot be used to produce military output in case of mobilization, something that reduces the opportunities for an effective build-up in the military-economic might in a period preceding an aggression. In addition, foreigners have an access to all documents of the enterprises and that obviates not only clandestine fulfillment of mobilization assignments but also production of any defense output whatsoever.

Taking place within the framework of globalization, transformation of the economic influence spheres of different states also placed an influence on the Russian military-economic potential. This dependence is explained by the fact that the level of military-economic potential and military-economic might strictly correlates with a state’s position in the world arena. A nation, which has economic interests the world over, must possess military might sufficient for maintaining them.

At the same time, an economically powerful state aspiring to world leadership is capable of concentrating its efforts on strategic goals, because the weaker rivals that surround it tend to renounce in advance a fight with the leader, which they are certain to lose. With a state’s economic weight in decline, the number of rivals and amount of disputed issues swells like a tidal wave, leading to dissipation of limited resources in many sectors. A graphic case in point is the deterioration of the Russian influence on the world economy. In the 1990s, the number of disputed issues and of countries pursuing an economic policy detrimental to this country grew substantially. If before that the whole of East Europe and some Asian and African countries were regarded as an economic influence zone of the USSR, the situation was reversed dramatically in the mid-1990s, something that led to a surge in rivalry in some external markets. On many counts, it became necessary to revise the pattern and directions of Russia’s mili tary-technical policy.

If previously it was directed at a confrontation with one global adversary, NATO, today it ought to provide for Russian interests in disputes with less powerful potential rivals, which nevertheless operate from several directions simultaneously. Consequently, the pattern of the military-economic potential must allow of an increased role of mobile forces and conventional high efficiency weapons. But it is impossible to increase troop mobility in an economically efficient manner unless there is a solution to the weapon standardization problem. After all, it is much cheaper to create an infrastructure for the rapid deployment of identical objects than to build specialized facilities, lines of communications, etc., for each of them separately. Yet, despite efforts in this direction, the complete standardization of the Russian weapons is still rather a long way off.

A leader state that enjoys economic dominance over one of the regions in most cases is capable of creating a coalition of dependent countries to jointly address some foreign policy problems. This approach makes it possible to use outside resources in one’s own interests. Moreover, the greater economic potential the region has, the greater economic and military-economic potential the leader can achieve.

At the same time, Russia, due to the rapid contraction of its economic influence zone, has to deal with tasks confronting it practically single-handedly and thus far cannot count on attracting considerable outside resources. But even in the existing international situation it is possible to find a number of sectors whose development will have a positive effect on Russia’s military-technical policy. One of these is international cooperation in developing and mastering the production of new WME types. Moreover, it seems expedient to have a dialogue in this sense not only with our traditional partners–China, India, and Ukraine–but also with other countries. As seen by the present writer, Russia may have interesting and promising variants of mutually advantageous cooperation in this sphere with Spain, Brazil and Israel.

The positive effect is likely to be enhanced if Russia adopts a tougher attitude toward nations engaged in unlicensed (piratical) technical servicing, modernization and maintenance of Russian-made military equipment. A state policy directed at encouraging foreign investors that put their money into the processing industry rat her than the primary sector will raise the general level of the military-economic potential as well.

An analysis of tendencies for shifts in a number of macroeconomic indicators shows That, starting 1999, there is a gradual change for the better in this sphere. Hopefully; the, realization by this country. of its; foreign economic interests and its consistent defense thereof will help a further build-up of its military-economic potential and a revival of its former might.

Table 1

Some Developmental Indicators in the 20th Century (in percentages)

Share Share Share Share

Groups of Countries of World of World of Overall of Internet

GDP Exports Direct Foreign Users

Investments

High-income states, 20% 86 82 68 93.3

Mid-income states, 60% 13 17 31 6.5

Low-income states, 20% 1 1 1 0.2

Table 2

Relation of Economic Potentials of the Main “Power Centers”

Main Indicators Euro Zone U.S.A. Japan Russia

General area, thou [km.sup.2] 2,364 9,373 378 17,075.2

1998 population 292 270 126.3 146.9

numbers, m persons

GDP, b dol. 1999 rate 6,765 9,256 4,349 182

1999 GDP growth, % 2.3 4.1 0.2 8.1

1999 budget balance, % -1.2 0.7 -7.6 -1.5

GDP

1999 public debt, % GDP 72.4 65.1 105.6 87.0

1998 exports, b dol. 870.0 680.5 387.9 74.2

1998 imports, b dol. 814.4 913.9 280.5 59.1

1998 trade balance, b dol. 55.6 -233.4 107.4 15.1

June 2000 gold and 203.6 51.7 253.5 15.6

currency reserves, b SDR *

1999 stock market 3,554.2 11,308.8 2,216.7 20.6

capitalization, b dol.

End-of-1999 unemployment 10.0 4.2 4.7 11.7

level, %

Main Indicators China

General area, thou [km.sup.2] 9,597.0

1998 population 1,238.6

numbers, m persons

GDP, b dol. 1999 rate 991

1999 GDP growth, % 7.1

1999 budget balance, % -6.7

GDP

1999 public debt, % GDP 14.9

1998 exports, b dol. 217.5

1998 imports, b dol. 159.8

1998 trade balance, b dol. 57.7

June 2000 gold and 121.1

currency reserves, b SDR *

1999 stock market 231.3

capitalization, b dol.

End-of-1999 unemployment

level, %

* SDR (Special Drawing Rights), a specialized unit of payment the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced in 1970. The SDR rate is

set on the basis of the national currencies basket, where the U.S.

dollar holds 45%, the euro 29%, the Japanese yen 15%, and the pound

sterling 11%. The SDR is used as a reference unit (equivalent) in a

broad range of IMF deals and operations.

Table 3

Changes in the Share of Exports in the Total Amount of Sales as Achieved

by Arms Producers from U.S., U.K. and France (in percentage)

Year

Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

U.S.A. 11 11 13 12 15 13

U.K. 32 28 28 29 41 48

France 25 26 20 17 22 30

Year

Country 1997 1998

U.S.A. 21 —

U.K. 50 48

France 41 40

Table 4

Contract Amounts for Weapons Supplies, Ten Biggest Exporters (m dol.)

1993-1996

U.S.A. 30,965

France 15,500

Russia 14,300

U.K. 6,300

China 2,200

Italy 1,600

Ukraine 1,400

Germany 1,200

Israel 1,100

The Netherlands 1,100

1997-2000

U.S.A. 30,486

Russia 16,200

France 9,200

China 5,000

Germany 4,600

U.K. 2,600

Sweden 2,300

Israel 1,500

Belgium 1,000

Belarus 1,000

Table 5

Actual Arms Supplies by Ten Biggest Exporters (m dol.)

1993-1996

U.S.A. 35,958

U.K. 19,200

Russia 8,400

France 6,400

Germany 3,300

China 3,000

Sweden 2,300

Israel 1,900

Canada 1,000

South Africa 900

1997-2000

U.S.A. 42,452

U.K. 18,000

France 15,500

Russia 8,900

Sweden 2,400

China 2,300

Germany 1,600

Ukraine 1,500

Belarus 1,100

Italy 1,000

Table 6

Changes in Russian GDP and Industrial Production in the 1990s (in

percentages on the previous year)

Indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

GDP 97.0 87.2 81.0 88.0 87.4 96.0 95.1 100.4 95.1 103.5

Industrial

production 99.9 92.0 82.0 86.0 79.0 97.0 96.0 101.9 95.0 108.1

amounts

Indicators 2000

GDP 107.7

Industrial

production 109.0

amounts

NOTES:

(1.) See: A.F. Klimenko, “Globalization and Its Impact on Military Politics and Military Strategy,” Military Thought, No. 3, 2002.,

(2.) Ibidem; Yu. v. Shishkov, Globalizatsiya ekonomiki–zakonomerniy produkt industrializatsiyii informatizatsiyi sotsiuma, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1999.

(3.) See: A National Security for a New Century, The White House, Washington, October 1998.

(4.) See: A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, The White House, Washington, December 2000.

(5.) See: Human Development Report 1999, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.

(6.) See: Voennaya ekonomika: teoriya i aktual’nyye problemy, Military Publishers, Moscow, 1999.

(7.) See: Human Development Report 1999; China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Press, 1999; Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoye polozheniye Rossii. 1999, State Statistical Committee of Russia, Moscow, 2000; Entering the 21st Century. World Development Report 1999/2000, The World Bank, 2000; The International Economic Analyst, Vol. 15, Issue 4, July/August 2000, Goldman Sachs, 2000; International Financial Statistics. September 2000, International Monetary Fund, 2000.

(8.) See: S. Popov, Metodika otsenki vliyaniya gosudarstv i ikh soyuzov na ekonomicheskuyu situatsiyu v mire i yego otdel’nykh regionakh, TsIVTI, Moscow, 2000; S. Popov, “Prognoz izmeneniya zon ekonomicheskogo vliyaniya nekotorykh gosudarstv na period do 2010 goda,” Voprosy prognostild, No. 1, 2000.

(9.) See: S. Popov, “Ekonomicheskiye prichiny voyennykh konfliktov,” Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 12, 2001, pp. 14-17; V. Galitskiy, S. Popov, “Pautina vliyaniya,” Ekspert, No. 42,2001, pp. 54-64.

(10.) Yezhegodnik SIPRI. 2000. Vooruzheniye, razoruzheniye i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost’, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2001.

(11.) Jeans, No. 9, 29 August 2001 (Based on Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000, US: Congressional Research Office).

(12.) Ibidem.

(13.) Yezhegodnik SIPRI. 2000.

(14.) Ibidem.

(15.) Sotsial’no-ekononzicheskoye polozheniye Rossii, State Statistical Committee of Russia, Moscow, 1992-2001.

(16.) Federal Laws “On the Federal Budget” for 1992-1997; Rossia-1999: ekonomicheskaja kon’yunktura, Issue 4, Economic Situation Center, Moscow, 1999.

(17.) A. Galiyev, “Oboronnaya initsiativa,” Ekspert, No. 40, 2002, p. 25; A. Makarov, “Kak tolknut’ yadro oboronnoy promyshlennosti,” Ekspert, No. 6, 1998, p. 51; “Snachala nado zashchitit’ stranu,” Ekspert, No. 45, 2001, p. 32.

(18.) 1989 international Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 1992.

(19.) Sistema tablits “Zatraty-Vypusk” for 199S, State Statistical Committee of Russia, Moscow, 2000, pp. 33 and 37.

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