FRANCHISING OPPORTUNITY: CORRUPTION INDICES AS MEASURES OF RISK AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING MARKETS
Wilhelm, Paul G
ABSTRACT
A saturated franchise marketplace is developing nationally. American franchising is therefore setting its sights internationally. Even though opportunities in emerging markets are huge, so are the risks. One way of assessing the risk of franchising in emerging markets is to consider the perceived level of corruption in those countries. Three recently developed measures of international corruption are validated and shown to correlate very significantly with gross domestic product per capita. Franchisors need to advise potential franchisees of the differing corruption levels in the various countries they are considering. Corruption can adversely affect product and service quality and adherence to standards set by franchisors.
INTRODUCTION
The potential for expansion of franchises in American markets apparently is stagnating. Franchisors have therefore begun looking to foreign markets to maintain growth. “The choice is either to stagnate or go overseas and grow” argues the president of the president of the Washington, D.C. based International Franchise Association (Martin, 1999). Companies are going abroad for an expanded ownership base and greater profits. The number of U.S. franchise buyers is shrinking very fast (Bennett, 1999), encouraging companies to go abroad.
Part of this movement may be due to the litigious gloom overshadowing U.S. franchising. A dour U.S. government Website at www.ftc.gov leads viewers to case summaries involving franchisors and crafty business developers who have landed in court for attempting to flim-flam opportunities that either: (a) did not exist, or (b) were misrepresented by these “creative” folk. Lawyers profit from these problems.
People buying franchises have to do things exactly the way things are laid out for them. Deviations from the system land franchisees in court (Ryan, Ray & Hiduke, 1999). Unfortunately, current U.S. laws, which purport to regulate franchising effectively, actually legalize rather then restrict abusive franchising practices. Franchisors need only disclose the details of their practices to make them enforceable. No minimum legal standards of fairness exist to protect the legitimate interests of the franchisees (Urlacher, 1999). The U.S. franchising business is regulated both by the individual states and by the Federal Trade Commission. Franchising is supposed to allow franchisees to know the details and risks prior to startup, and the astute franchisor makes this analysis readily available (Bygrave, 1994). Much of the regulation is supposed to ensure that franchisors provide the information necessary for franchisees to make informed decisions. However, franchisees contend that these rules are widely abused (Dollinger, 1999).
Survival rates of U.S. franchises have been argued to be much lower than traditionally reported, and the security that some people associate with franchising is an illusion (Lambing & Kuehl, 2000). Bates (1995) found that of the people who had purchased their franchises in 1987, only 54 percent were still running the business running the business in 1991, 8 percent had sold it, and 38 percent had lost their franchise.
RISKS OF FRANCHISING IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
Franchisers must be careful in evaluating franchise opportunities and choosing the best franchising options best for them (Dollinger, 1999). For example, the opportunities in emerging markets are huge but so are the risks. More validated information on these potential risks is needed to help franchisers to make better decisions on which emerging markets are worth the risk. Franchising has been argued to be more risky than exporting and licensing but considerably less risky than joint ventures and alliances (Wild, Wild, & Han, 2000).
The rate of franchising failures is probably higher in developing countries and transitional countries moving from planned to market based economies. Entrepreneurial development in transitional economies, with the exception of Central European countries and China, has been hindered by underdeveloped legal and financial infrastructure and considerable administrative corruption in different government offices. Without a legal regulatory framework, both efficiency and equity are adversely affected while crime and corruption are allowed to grow. Difficulties with property rights lead to a high cost of conducting business. Legal agreements today may be illegal or heavily taxed tomorrow. Laws, regulations and taxes are often contradictory (Luthans, Stajkovic, & Ibrayeva, 2000). Many observers believe that the maze of business regulations is usually dense and unpredictable in less developed countries and contract enforcement can be problematic (Tybout, 2000).
Nevertheless, the 1990s have seen financial investors, corporate strategists and political leaders in the industrialized countries focusing on emerging markets. Dow 30 companies have placed enormous bets on their success in these markets using the limited information on risk available to them. The Clinton administration’s export-promotion strategy considers the most promising markets not to be Europe or Japan but rather the so called big emerging markets. The industrialized nations have also hopped on to this bandwagon, but probably without adequately considering the huge risks involved (Garten, 1998).
THE NEED FOR BETTER MEASURES OF RISK
Fortunately, recent measures of risk have been developed and used in emerging nations. These measures have been recently validated (Jain, 1998), and in this study, using a much larger sample size, are correlated with economic development in the 1980s through 1995 for developing as well as industrialized nations.
Utilizing three recent measures of corruption as an indication of risk helps meet some of the 18 factors Sherman (1993, p. 463) argues must be satisfied to establish and operate international franchises. The two most relevant factors he lists are “Satisfying governmental and legal restrictions” and “Analyzing potential or different markets.” The problem of the risk of corruption probably is of crucial concern to international franchisers. Accounting standards in the early 1990s differed significantly across countries, even countries with comparable incomes per capita (World Bank, 1999). In general, poor countries tend to have weak legal and accounting systems (LaPorta et aL 1998: Levine, Loayza, & Beck 1998; World Bank, 1999). Many of the lowest-income economies have the weakest accounting systems, often with few trained accountants, and in some cases no uniform system of accounts. Hence, reliable information on company performance is lacking.
Governments around the world – especially after the rash of financial crises in the 1990’s- are beginning to recognize the importance of information they gather. Overwhelmingly, economic growth is strongly influenced by adequate accounting and legal infrastructure to support information gathering and by enforcing contracts based on such information (World Bank, 1999). Future international franchisers would therefore do well to review the data on how strong the legal and accounting infrastructure is in the emerging economies they are considering. Unfortunately the data for only 29 countries is available (Levine et al, 1998). Intuitively, the strength of legal and accounting systems would vary inversely with the corruption levels. Fortunately, data on three measures of corruption for upwards of a hundred nations has recently become available. Franchisers could legitimately use these three measures of corruption to avoid the riskiest countries if the measures’ validity was established, and if they significantly correlated with economic measures, such as GNP growth rate per capita.
THREE MEASURES OF INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
Two measures of corruption come from a composite ten factor measure of economic freedom for 150 countries. These measures provide compelling evidence that prosperity and economic freedom go hand in hand (Johnson et al, 1998).
The factor of over-regulation was compiled utilizing information from embassies, interviews with businesses engaged in the country, and World Bank data. In countries such as the U.S., obtaining a business license is as simple as mailing in a registration form with a minimal fee. In relatively more corrupt countries, such as those in Africa and of South America, obtaining a business license entails never ending trips to a government building, countless bribes and upwards of a year of waiting time. With the selective or haphazard enforcement of regulations, business owners become confused over which regulations must be obeyed. Too many regulations can cause corruption as harried business owners try to avoid red tape. Countries are rated on a Likert-type scale ranging from one (corruption-free) to five (very corrupt), wherein government discourages new business creation, bribes are mandatory and regulations are applied randomly (Johnson et al, 1998).
The factor of size of black market is measured by answering several questions. For example, does the country have a substantial smuggling market? If so, does this indicate too many restrictions on foreign imports? Do consumers have to turn to black marketeers to obtain televisions and other electronics? This could indicate that they are not legally available or that too high of tariffs are being applied. Are there many illegal workers, indicating an overly regulated economy where labor must be supplied by the black market? These and other activities were used to estimate the size of the black market as a percentage of gross domestic product. Where black market information exists for specific countries, it is noted. A score of one was given where the black market constituted less than 10 percent of GDP. At the other-end of the scale, a five was scored where the black market made up 30 percent or more of GDP (Johnson et al, 1998).
The third measure of unethical activity is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which draws upon numerous distinct surveys of primarily business people and risk analysts who are close enough to actual incidences of corruption and who can adequately recognize corruption when they see or experience it. For 85 countries, scores range between 10 (highly clean), down to 0 (or very corrupt, in which a country’s business transactions are entirely dominated by kickbacks, extortion, bribery, etc.).
The index is a “poll of polls,” and has been prepared using seven sources, including two surveys from the World Competitiveness Yearbook, Institute for Management development, Lausanne; one from the Political and Economic Risk Consultancv Ltd., Hong Kong; one by Gallup International; two assessments by DRI/McGraw-Hill Global Risk Service, and the Political Risk Services, East Syracuse, New York; and lastly a survey conducted at Gottingen University via internet (http://www.uni-gottingen.de/uwuw) which gives contributors the possibility for anonymous contributions and also directly approaches employees of multinational firms and institutions. Because these measures are consistently reproducing similar assessments, they are argued to be an indicator of a real world phenomenon (Transparency International, 1997a).
Attention has been focused on corruption in international business by Transparency International (TI), a non-governmental international organization founded in 1993 with headquarters in Berlin. Its mission is to “support global integrity systems both nationally and on the international level.” In the 1998 index of 85 countries, for which data were available ( see Table 1), the Scandinavian countries again ranked at the top of the list, perceived as being least corrupt. The nations perceived to be most corrupt were Nigeria, Tanzania, Honduras, Paraguay, and Cameroon.
The reliability of the new CPI data is improved by including only countries that have been part of 1996 and 1997 polls. The publishers argued that the use of historical comparison and the relative stability of data indicated a high level of credibility despite using only three surveys for some countries. They contended that the idea of combining data implied that a malperformance of one source could be smoothed by the inclusion of at least two other sources. This way the likelihood of misrepresenting a country was reduced (TI, 1998a).
Nevertheless the CPI figures are acknowledged as somewhat subjective because an objective approach is almost impossible. Corruption is by definition hidden. It is the misuse of public officials, taking kickbacks in public procurement or embezzling public funds. The CPI tries to assess the degree to which public officials and politicians in particular countries are involved in corrupt practices. Of course there is objective data created by the justice system and the media. However, this data rather measures the effectiveness of the media in discovering and reporting scandals and how independent and well trained the judiciary is in prosecuting corruption. An efficient and incorruptible judiciary may result in a high conviction rate. Instead of acknowledging this, “objective” data would punish such countries with a bad score (Transparency International, 1997a).
The need for validating the CPI by correlating it with other measures of corruption was still evident. Fortunately all 85 countries rated by the CPI were also rated independently by Johnson et al (1998). Both sets of authors had argued that corruption would have a negative effect on a country’s economy. A measure of real gross domestic product per capita (RGDP/Cap) was included (United Nations Development Programme, 1998).
Because the CPI has a reverse scoring direction from that of the Black Market Score (BMS) and the Excess Regulation Score (ERS), it is hypothesized (H1 and H2) that the CPI will negatively correlate with BMS and ERS respectively. Hypothesis three (H3) is that the CPI will positively correlate with RGDP/Cap. A fourth hypothesis (H4) is that BMS and ERS will correlate positively with each other. The fifth and sixth hypotheses (H5 and H6) are that BMS and ERS respectively will negatively correlate with RGDP/Cap. Finding correlations in the predicted directions for the three measures of national corruption will establish these measures are consistent and reliable. Finding correlations in the predicted direction for the three measures of corruption with RGDP/Cap will validate the theory that corruption ultimately reduces economic growth.
RESULTS
Table II shows highly significant correlations (probability less than 0.001), all in the predicted direction, indicating that the three measures of international corruption are reliable. Their validity is strongly suggested by highly significant correlations with RGDP/Cap for the 85 countries for which data was available (there were a few cases of missing or unavailable data). The CPI had the strongest correlation with RGDP/cap, far more than the other two measures of corruption, even though they were highly significant. A coefficient this high (r = 0.86) is very rare when using international data. This author asked three economists what correlation they would predict between corruption and RGDP/Cap, and they forecasted an average of 0.3. All three corruption correlated significantly with GNPPCAGR indicating that countries with less corruption, over-regulation, and black market activity tend to economies growing at a significantly faster rate over a fifteen year period.
DISCUSSION
Establishing that these three measures of international corruption are reliable and valid may help predict economic repercussions for franchisers contemplating doing business in other countries. Recently, KMPG Peat Marwick surveyed nearly 4,000 companies in 18 countries and determined that the majority of them believed global fraud will increase in years to come. Reasons differ by region but are primarily due to worsening economic pressures, weakening of societal values and increased fraud opportunity provided by technology such as cellular telephones, the Internet and international wire transfers (Thomas, 1998).
Given the findings of this study, an increase in global corruption will have very predictable and profoundly negative effects on world economies. As franchisers engage in more and more business around the globe, their assumptions about ethical codes of conduct are tested. A validated predictor of corruption can allow franchisers to better anticipate corruption. In less corrupt countries executives may face simple questions such as the appropriate amount of money to spend on a business gift. When going to more corrupt countries, expatriates may be trained in how to handle or avoid out-and-out bribery, child-labor disputes, environmental abuse, and assorted illegal or questionable business practices. Many international franchisors will probably have to create more detailed codes of conduct for those doing business in more corrupt countries. Perhaps they will need to incorporate their messages into everyday business practices and make them living documents. This might be reinforced by creating appraisal systems that reinforce the ethical behavior the company demands (C. M. Solomon, 1998).
International franchisers could better decide where to locate subsidiaries knowing the probable long-term effects of locating in a more corrupt country. They could better negotiate for tax concessions knowing the likely additional costs of corruption on their profits. Hopefully these very strong statistics will help focus attention on global corporate responsibilities. A moral tightrope still has to be walked between the two extremes of ethical fanaticism and ethical relativism as we venture into other nation’s economies and cultures.
Publication of the CPI has had a major political impact in several countries such a Pakistan, Malaysia, Mexico and Argentina after governmental leaders reacted to the results. These leaders know about the connection between perceived corruption and direct foreign investment.
For example, Mexico’s relative standing in the corruption rankings has inproved over the past three years and this is supported by anecdotal evidence. In Mexico, la mordida, translated as “the bite,” is a wry Spanish euphemism for bribery. The culture of la mordida appears to be waning in Mexico. It used to be next to impossible to do business in Mexico without paying a bribe. Many companies are now doing fine, without paying. Deregulation of the economy is removing opportunity for corrupt officials to demand bribes. Fifteen years ago, opening a store or franchise in Mexico City might have required 25 permits versus 3 or 4 today. La mordida is declining due to a growing revulsion felt by a new generation of Mexican business and professional people now coming into their own. Young people understand that unless Mexico defeats corruption, it will be rebuked by the international business community (Balloon, 1999). Pro-business and anticorruption political platforms appeal to many in the middle class and executive boardroom (Smith, 1999).
These findings can help make business ethics sections of entrepreneurship and franchising courses more relevant for even the most cynical students. It would be very hard to find variables such as corruption that correlate so highly with RGDP/Cap. Nevertheless, international franchisers can take heart in that corrupt foreign cultures can change over time. For example, the notion of private property is new to modern Russian culture, which is rated by the 1998 CPI as highly corrupt (ranking as the tenth most corrupt of 85 nations measured in 1998). It is now argued that Russian business people are apparently realizing that behaving in an ethical fashion – fulfilling contractual obligations – is in their long-term self-interest (Martin, 1997). Unfortunately the black market is estimated to be 40% of GDP. However, the new Russian President Putin is taking steps to reduce this corruption (Starobin, 1999).
This paper’s findings also supports Goldsmith’s (1995) assertion that corrupt practices are more prevalent in many emerging and transitional economies today, wherein official corruption often runs so deep that it is a hindrance to commercial activity. The latest example in a large country would be the rampant corruption wrecking construction of modern China. The Chinese government is currently spending billions of dollars on infrastructure projects, hoping that booming construction will fend off the economic malaise afflicting other Asian countries and help ensure social stability at a time of fast rising unemployment. The money, however, is being ill spent because unscrupulous contractors and greedy local officials are skimming funds and cutting comers. Authorities now fear that hasty and corrupt construction will result in calamities. Unsuitable materials and extremely poor quality construction have already resulted in loss of lives, such as when dikes collapse, killing thousands of people. Widespread skepticism about the quality of new apartment buildings has slowed a program to privatize government-supplied housing, inhibiting attempts to spur consumer spending in that area (Kurtenbach, 1999). Periodically, the government initiates severe actions to stem corruption, such as executions. Nevertheless, the spread of corruption continues unabated (Nair, 1998).
The problem with franchising in China and other corrupt countries is that standards are often unenforced and shoddy products prevail. Franchisors commonly impose (and strictly enforce) design and appearance standards (Bangs and Pinson, 1999). While such standards ensure a uniform quality of goods and services in all the outlets, complying with the standards may be prohibitively expensive in more corrupt countries.
The World Bank conceded that it failed to confront corruption in Indonesia prior to the onset of the country’s financial crisis in 1997. The Bank, like many others, was taken by surprise, and could have been better prepared. The Bank’s staff and managers were aware that Indonesian banks were riddled with bad loans and its political system with corruption, right up to President Suharto’s family. However, the bank’s ceaseless praise of Indonesia’s economic performance “significantly contributed to complacency” that actually deadened the impact of development assistance (Phillips, 1999). Now that this study establishes such a strong negative relationship between economic development and corruption, economists will be less complacent about corruption.
Mexico is ranked as the 56th most corrupt of the 85 nations measured by the CPI in 1998. In a fairly corrupt country such as Mexico, it hits people at all levels, ranging from the grand larceny of politicians to the cop who settles tickets in the street. Corruption was for so many years a part of the system that Mexicans do not feel particularly offended by it. Corruption is argued to be entrenched in tradition and structures and is the most democratic thing in Mexico’s culture. Corruption gives many people access to judges that they would not otherwise have (Parfit, 1996). Perhaps franchisors could learn how their system works before doing business there. If certain relatively corrupt countries cannot be avoided, franchisors may have to accept the finding that preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention (behind zero-tolerance government intervention), may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000).
On the other hand, living up to contracts has become routine in advanced capitalist counties, especially where franchising is concerned. This is a moral routine gained from systematic enforcement by the state. Pursuing and arresting swindlers and cheaters and punishing those who break contract, is crucial for sustaining business and consumer confidence. Without secure claims to ownership and associated rights, people will be less likely to become franchisers or buy and sell, lend and invest, with economic growth subsequently less than it would be otherwise (Torstensson, 1994). A cyclical effect may well occur here, with countries having higher incomes being able to devote more funds to fighting corruption. This cycle may more explain the exceedingly high correlation achieved by this study.
Uncorrupted human capital is the engine of economic development. It is impossible to tap the energy and creativity of people in places where the natural rights to free expression, free movement and free association are suppressed. Nations offering their citizens an environment of both legal order and individual freedom tend to be more prosperous and innovative (Melloan, 1999). Countries with legal systems which enforce contracts rapidly, effectively, and transparently, imposing penalties for fraud and breach of contract, enjoy greater financial development and faster economic growth (The World Bank, 1999). This is where international franchisers are likely to be most successful.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The international data in this study supports the observation that in less corrupt nations, an ethical cycle is apparently operating, with economic growth, corruption fighting, building trust, and innovation all reinforcing each other. The international burden of raising awareness about the necessity for a high moral and ethical ground when franchisers venture abroad may reside in the educational arena (Barton, 1995). This study provides a mandate for this. The companies selling franchises also need to effectively educate franchisers about what is considered legal and moral before they cultivate agreements abroad. Universities, as well as trade associations and the news media, can all play a stronger role in fulfilling this mandate. Data in this study strongly confirms ethics as the “central managerial virtue” as it has recently been argued (R. Solomon, 1998).
Governments of developing countries, which tend to rank among the most corrupt on all three measures of corruption used in this study, need to undertake legal measures and administrative reforms in their political-economic systems. In many emerging markets, a number of needs must be addressed before corruption can be permanently reduced. Market regulation is often highly underdeveloped. Rigid labor laws should be restructured. Foreign investment is discouraged by limits on prices for both telecommunications and energy. Government payrolls need to be downsized and the savings put into attracting more skilled and experienced people to the bureaucracy.
The massive amounts of red tape that still interfere with normal business transactions need to be slashed (Garten, 1999). Most initiatives by foreign agencies designed to encourage enterprise in poorer nations cause more problems than benefits. Harper (1991) argues for a minimalist approach, i.e., reducing the amount of government and foreign involvement. Accessible credit at reasonable interest rates is one of the most effective programs.
Corporations selling franchises should consider internal systemic changes (Amba-Rao, 1993). The role of professionals, such as those in marketing and environmental concerns, is crucial in recognizing ethical contexts in economies that are undergoing major changes. Further study needs to be made of how government, education and business will meet these challenges (Amba-Rao, 1997).
International franchisors should recognize the limitations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The law prohibits U. S. companies or individuals from making corrupt payments to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or keeping business. It not only outlaws bribes directly by U.S. citizens, residents, and any business organized under the laws of the U.S., but also any bribes made by intermediaries. Thus the foreign distributors, agents, (including franchisees), and subsidiaries of U.S. companies are not allowed to pay bribes. However, even though the FCPA prohibits bribes, payments to facilitate or expedite routine governmental actions are allowed (Foley, 1999).
It is generally accepted that grease payments, which are sums paid to a lower-level foreign official to carry out a routine governmental action, are legal. This should be an action that the foreign official would normally perform such as documentation. It should not be an action outside the normal routine of the job. For example, it would be illegal to pay a custom offices to waive through contraband or lift an import fee (Carroll & Gannon, 1997).
Specifically, the FCPA lists the following examples as routine governmental actions eligible for facilitating or expediting payments:
Obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents; processing govern-mental papers, such as visa protection, mail pickup and delivery; providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or pro- tecting perishable products; and scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or transit of goods across country (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996).
Any franchise considering paying grease money should consult an attorney to ensure this action is legal. An incorrect interpretation of the law could be expensive. When the FCPA was first enacted, the U.S. seemed the only supporter of anti-bribery practices. Other governments say the legislation was an attempt by the US to impose its moral code onto foreign countries. However, recent trends demonstrate that other countries are beginning to support the U.S. position. For example, 34 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation of Development signed a binding agreement in 1997 outlawing bribery of foreign public officials. Therefore, many U.S. firms believe the FCPA has helped them because it offered them a legal basis to refuse to pay bribes (Foley, 1999).
American franchisers will need to accept that in today’s intensely competitive world, ethical behavior isn’t an outmoded luxury. People tend to do business with other people whom they trust. A company’s leaders must support an ethics program wholeheartedly if they expect it to be taken seriously.
An ethics program should be a continuous effort, involving employees from the start. Ethical programs, especially for international franchisers, should include a code or credo or set of standards that they or their employees agree to abide by. Customers and vendors can even be brought in on the formulation of the code (Barrier, 1999). The best ethics programs meld company culture and values, sound out employees, and give them a trusted confessional to vent grievances internally (McCarthy, 1999). Values, or deeply held principles and beliefs, can be powerful motivators that, when shared, form a foundation for corporate culture (Shellenbarger,1999).
Consistent with this thinking, the International Franchise Association (UFA wants to scrap its eight-year-old “Code of Principles and Standards of Conduct” in favor of a more general “aspirational code,” expected to be finalized in the year 2000. The IF A is a trade group dominated by franchise chains. For years it has been chided by outlet owners who consider the code a joke and say the IFA hasn’t acted against its members over mistreatment of outlet owners. The densely worded four page code currently duplicates many items covered in franchise contracts and government regulations, and is subject to legal hairsplitting (Morse, 2000).
Therefore the IF A is working with the Ethics Resources Center, Washington, D.C., a nonprofit organization that helps trade associations establish a uniform set of standards. The IFA is also planning to promote peaceful systems, and is trying to set up an ombudsman program to help settle issues in those systems that aren’t so peaceful. The new code will clearly spell out a model of ethical conduct that more people will heed (Morse, 2000).
Educators wanting to communicate the principles of free enterprise to their franchising students should emphasize the role of moral principles in any effective society. In teaching the fundamentals of the marketplace, the role of reputation and the consequential importance of one’s actual honesty and trustworthiness must be stressed (DeBow, 1999).
Economies work best when governments adopt clear rules and stick to them (Wessel, 2000). The least corrupt governments will provide the clearest and most consistent rules which are fair to both franchisor and franchisee. The IFA should continue working on codes consistent with reducing international corruption.
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Paul G. Wilhelm
University of Texas of the Permian Basin
John C. Milewicz
Jacksonville State University
Paul G. Wilhelm is Assistant Professor of Management at University of Texas of the Permian Basin, where he also serves as Area Coordinator for management, Marketing and Decision Sciences. Prior to earning a doctorate degree from the University of Iowa, Wilhelm had many years of small business experience. He has taught and/or published research in human resource management and organizational behavior, strategic management and small business, international business, and etiiics. Currently, he is researching international corruption, culture, and economics franchising. He also serves as faculty advisor for the Students in Free Enterprise (SIFE) collegiate chapter.
John Milewicz is a marketing professor at Jacksonville State University. His research interests include forecasting, reputational and credibility development, and market signaling cues impact on consumer and industrial firms. He has published extensively in leading journals such as die Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Journal of Consumer Marketing, Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, Journal of Product & Brand Marketing, and Market Intelligence & Planning.
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